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1. 
Introduction 
One of the most pressing questions currently being asked in 
Canada is whether our nineteenth century local government structures 
impede the solution of twentieth century urban problems? The answer 
of late most often has been, yes. Hi thin the last decade, grO'tving public 
concern about pollution, express\·:ays, housing and demands for that 
vague entity called participation, has prompted every Canadian province 
to review the workings of its local government system. Several important 
restructurings have resulted but the reform in Winnipeg, Manitoba has 
recently attra.cted the most attention. 1 
On Saturday, July 24, 1971, the legislature of the Provtnce of 
Manitoba, gave third and final reading to Bill 36, "The City of Gre2.ter 
lJinnipeg Act". The passage of the Unicity Bill ended one of the most 
bitter conflicts of modern Manitoba politics and ushered in a unique ex-
periment in North P~erican metropolitan government. 
Bill 36 is interesting both for its substance and the process 
vrhich led to its creation and adoption. The nev7 Hinnipeg local government 
structure is a genuine innovation which attempts to combine political 
decentralization through the use of community co~~ittees and citizen advisory 
groups - \vith the amalgamation of t\·7elve municipalities into one big city. 
This combination of administrative and service centralization, ,,7ith built-in 
participatory channels, has led observers to label Hinnipeg's experiment 
as the most exciting urban development in Canada since the formation of 
Metropolitan Toronto in 1953. 2 
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It is, of course, too early to assess the success or failure of 
the new structure. The Unicity council was only incorporated January 1, 
1972. But what can be examined now is the process '!rlhich led to the 
adoption of the reform. The successful introduction o~ change is one of 
the most difficult processes in politics and the Hinnipeg experience 
may contain lessons for other areas. 
Literature Revie-~:.;r 
The existing literature on 'Hetropolitan reform is of little 
help to Canadian students. Most of the material is dra'.;rn from American 
sources and ~.rhile these contain useful accounts of battles to get Hetro-
politan reform in Hiami, city-county consolidation in Nashville~ etc., the 
precepts of Jacksonian democracy ·and the resulting hurdles of local 
referendums are alien to Canadian tradition.3 The general literature on 
political change is, of course, voluminous but the application of many 
o·f the concepts to the specifics of urban politics is a hazardous process. 4 
Two studies \.rhich do apply directly are Harold Kaplan's Urban 
Political Svstems, and Frank Smalhmod 's Greater London: The Politics of 
MetroP.olitan Reform. Smalhrood has adapted the game-contestant approach 
of Sayre and Kaufman to the parliamentary system and clearly shows.the effect 
of that particular government form on the type of strategy that various groups 
employ in supporting or opposing reform.S Kaplan studies the impact of 
environment on styles of local politics and hypothesizes that the large 
degree of social consensus and the low pressure or temperature of Toronto 
partially explains the existence of an executive-centered system.6 From the 
study of 'Kaplan and Smallwood it appears that four basic questions must be 
asked about any atteTipt to gain reform: 
1) What is the political culture and distribution 
of power? 
2) What are the conditions which lead to the initiation 
of reform? 
3) What kinds of resources and motivations are held 
by the participants in the contest? 
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4) ~~at strategies are employed by the contending factions? 
The first section of the case study describes the political 
environment of Winnipeg and briefly summarizes the history of local govern-
ment in the city. Particular attention is paid to the dispute between 
the Metropolitan Corporation and the City of Winnipeg. The clash of these 
two bodies so innnobilized urban policy making in VJinnipeg that the pro-
vincial government not only perceived the need for change but was prepared 
to carry it out. Part I then attempts to ansvTer questions one and tvro. 
Part II describes the process which led to the creation of the unicity plan 
and analyzes the various sections of Bill 36. Part II examines the 
motivations and strategies of the participants involved in the battle over 
the adoption of the bill. 
Part I 
The Political Environ.TJlent of \Vinnipeg 
Like any political environment, Winnipeg has been shaped by demographic, 
economic, and historical forces. The life of a city is a constant balancing 
betw·een conflict and co-operation7 and socio-economic forces largely determine 
the conditions 'tvhich either increase the sense of connnunity or foster 
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disintegration. Population size, density and heterogenity~~or ~xample, 
can generate both resources - energy, diversity, economic strength or 
conflict - ethnic disputes, overcrm,;rding, etc. Historical events can 
condition the local political cultureS which, in turn, .affects attitudes 
towards corruption, the scope of local government -activities, or the 
development of a local party system. Some of the more important environ-
mental factors which have affected the life of Hinnipeg can be classed 
under: 
(1) Population characteristics 
(2) Economic Indicators 
(3) The Ethnic Transformation 
Population Characteristics 
Hinnipeg has a population approaching 550,000 and an area of over 
228 square miles. Prior to amalgamation the region was governed by 14 
separate units - the Hetropolitan Corporation, the central City of Hinnipeg 
and 12 suburban municipalities (See Table 1 and Figure I). 
*The original inhabitants of Hhat is now Hanitoba were the Indian 
people, primarily Cree, Saulteau and Chippewayan. There are noH approxi-
mately 32,000 Indian people in Hanitoba and 34,000 Metis.9 It is estimated 
that at the beginning of the 1960's there -v1ere only 5,000- 6,000 Indian/ 
Hetis people residing in "Hinnipeg, but by 1971, 15,000 - lfO,O()O native 
people lived in the city, almost all in the dmvntm-m core.lO In a survey 
undertaken by the Indian-l~etis Friendship Centre and the Institute of Urban 
Studies, it ~as found that sn~~ of the native people had family income under 
$4,000, 17.3% 1-1ere unemployed, and 12/: v.Tere on vrelfare.ll This shift in 
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the last decade from rural reserves to downtovm \.Jinnipeg has helped 
create the situation recognized by the government Hhite Paper on Urban 
Reorganization, that, "Social ills and hence social costs tend to con-
centrate in the core area. These costs have to be bor~e almost entirely 
by taxpayers in the central area despite the fact that many of the people 
requiring social services and creating social costs have migrated to the 
1 f 1 . . . ..12 centra area rom out y1ng commun1t1es. 
With the development of the fur trade, French Canadian traders 
came to Manitoba with many of them eventually settling in the St. Boniface 
area. Over 8% of the population of Greater Winnipeg is French-Canadian. 
Thomas Douglas, Earl of Selkirk, brought the Selkirk settlers to 
the Red River Valley in 1811-12 and from that time onward settlers from 
the British Isles and Ontario formed the base for the growing population. 
Icelanders and Mennonites arrived during the 1870's and by 1900, thousan~s 
of Ukrainians, Poles, Germans and Jews were being lured by free land and 
cheap transportation. Table 2 indicates the huge jump in Hinnipeg 1 s popu-
lation between 1901 - 1921 with the rise steady but unspectacular after 
that date. The city fathers, in the early 1900 1 s, thought Hinnipeg 'tvould 
become the Canadian Chicago and consequently built the wide thoroughfares 
of Portage and Hain and the huge aqueduct to Shoal Lake (completed in 1919) 
to accommodate a population t\vice the size of Hinnipeg at the time. It 
was a bit of misplaced boosterism that has eventually earned the accolade 
of "far-sighted urban planning". (See Table 2) • 
.. , 
r~ 
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The last demographic indicator of some importance is the rate 
of growth. Compared to other urban centers in Canada, Hinnipeg has 
lagged behind. From 1961 - 1966 the population increased by 6.9% com-
pared to the national rate of 9.7% and from 1966- 1970 the rate was 
only 5%, compared to 16% for Toronto, 15% for Vancouver, 16% for Edmonton 
and 21% for Calgary. This slow rate of growth, however, has been regarded 
by many as a blessing. The housing shortage is less severe in Hinnipeg 
than many Canadian centers and there is time to assess the nature of the 
problems. As the current president of the Downtovm Business Association 
: 1~ (has said, 11He don 1 t ~vant faster grmvth. Now we have time to plan and ~hink things over". 
~fuat growth there has been is largely concentrated in the suburbs. 
Since 1961 the City of Hinnipeg has had a loss of population of 3% (vJith 
the dovmtown core decreasing by nearly 10% despite the influx of native 
peoples). Since 1951 the suburban municipalities have doubled their popu-
lation and they showed about a 20% increase from 1961- 1966. 13 
Like many North American cities since v:'orld Har II, "the municipalities 
/ 
!. have been the target for much of this population movement from the City of 
) 
I Winnipeg, '·7hile the central city itself is often the destinat-ion of 
! 
I f •1• f 1 v • b d f 1114 l: am1 1es rom rura 1'1an1to a an rom overseas. 
Economic Indicators 
The gro·wth of Hinnipeg has not been dramatic but it has accounted 
for most of the increase in Hanitoba as a whole. A 1969 estimate placed 
the population of Hanitoba at 980,000 v7ith \'linnipeg accounting for 54% of 
this total. The rural population of Manitoba has declined steadily from 
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55.9% in 1941 to 32.9% in 1966 to an estimated 30% in 1969. 15 The 
Metro report, The Place of Greater Winnipeg in the Economy of Manitoba, 
showed that from 1961- 1966, the growth of Winnipeg accounted for 77.9% 
of the grm:..rth of Manitoba and that from 1966 - 1969 'Hetropolitan vJinnipeg 
continued to grov7 while the rest of the province lost population. 
Winnipeg provides about t~vo-thirds of all the jobs in the province 
of Manitoba, two-thirds of all provincial income and about three-quarters 
f h . d .. d 1 . 16 o t e 1n 1v1 ua 1ncome tax. In short, it is in a paramount position 
within Manitoba and dominates the province even more than New York City 
vis-a-vis New York State. 
This situation has had obvious political implications. Until 
1958 when Duff Roblin \von the provincial election, Manitoha had been 
governed by a succession of conservative small totNn lawyers and farmers 
in a heavily rural dominated legislature. A "us versus them" mentality 
often prevailed and Hinnipeg '\·<as vieHed Hith suspicion. The creation of 
the Hetropolitan Corporation was opposed by several rural members because 
it ~·muld help the development of Hinnipeg and this vie\v was again expressed 
a decade later when Unicity was being debated. 
This provincial indifference to Hinnipeg r s urban problems l·las 
expressed in more concrete ways that florid rhetoric from backbenchers. The 
report on the Place of Greater 1-Jinnipeg in the Economy of Hanitoba, systematically 
examined the different types of provincial expenditure and found that, 
in education, for example, Hinnipeg received only $1.43 in provincial funds 
for every dollar received locally while the comparable figure in the rest 
of the provinces was $4.95. In the areas of housing, and other "urban 
8. 
17 
oriented programs, the province simply has not had any of consequence.n 
In transportation, Hinnipeg received only 9.5% of the provincial expenditure 
on highways, despite repeated demands from the Metro Corporation for more 
assistance and even in non-financial matters such as the location of 
\ 
provincial buildings, like the head offices for the Manitoba Telephone 
System, Hydro-Electric Board, Hedical. Services Building and Red River 
Cormnunity College, the province paid little attention to the l'1etro redevelop-
ment plans. 
Winnipeg's paramount position in the province has had different 
consequences. On the one hand, it is simply too important to ignore. The 
economic well-being of Manitoba depends on the health of Hinnipeg and in 
political terms, half the province's population does reside there. But 
its very strength has naturally made rural Manitobans and their representatives 
eager to put the weight of the provincial government on the side of rural 
l'lanitoba. It ;.;as not until Duff Roblin, an urban man and the N .D.P. under 
Edward Schreyer, an urban goverP~ent, came to power that this provincial 
neglect began to change. / 
I.Jithin Manitoba, then, Winnipeg looms large. But from another 
perspective, it is quite small and has many of the attributes of a folksy 
to~m. It is, after all, only half a million. Economically it is integrated 
with most people travelling outside their home area to 't·mrk dovmtown. Shopping 
plazas of course exist but most of the major stores and almost all the 
entertainment facilities are in the dm·mtmm area. Participation in community 
projects, like the 1967 Pan American Games or the former annual dyking of 
the Red and Assiniboine at flood time is enthusiastic and city \vide. 18 The 
')-. ( 
__ ,. 
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dictates of the environment (waiting for a street light at Portage and 
Main in January is one of the supreme tests faced by man) have forced 
citizens to co-operate since the Selkirk Settlers arrived in 1811 and the 
relative isolation of Winnipeg has also req~ired that the city fall back 
on its own resources. The city supports, for example, a summer musical 
company, a symphony orchestra, a professional theatre company and one of 
the best ballet troupes in the world -- cultural resources unusual for 
a North American city of its size. Definitions of 'community' or degrees 
of integration are notoriously difficult concepts to operationalize but 
~by almost any standard, Hinnipeg was 
\__before the political unification of 
a social and economic whole long 
Bill 36. 
-:£ The Ethnic Transformation 
I 
The railways have left an indelible roark on Hinnipeg. They have 
made the city one of the major transportation clearinghouses in North 
America; brought hundreds of thousands of immigrants; and physically divided 
the city into north and south. The C.P.R. tracks between Logan and 
Selkirk Avenue mark the boundary of \.Jinnipeg 1 s North End, the ethnic center 
of the city, the province, and probably the prairies. Seventy percent 
British in 1900, the percentage of Manitobans of Arcglo-Saxon stock has 
fallen to around 40% and 1\iinnipeg is nmv one of the most ethnically 
heterogeneous areas in Canada, Groups~ ho':-1ever, have tended to settle in 
definite areas; as Table 3 indicates. British descendents are inclined 
to live in the suburbs and the outer parts of Hinnipeg (River Heights), 
French Canadians concentrate in St. Boniface and the Poles, Germans and 
Ukrain:i.ans still reside in \.Jinnipeg and particularly its central core. 
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This ethnic pattern of settlement has played a major role in 
local politics. M.S. Donnelly has shmvn that aldermanic elections follow 
ethnic majorities - not one alderman has been elected in a ~.;rard 1:vhere 
f h . 19 he did not have a large community o his ethnic origin.to support 1m. 
And, today, in the province 'tvhere "foreignersn ~.;rere once the objects of 
ridicule, the mayor of the capital city is a Ukrainian Catholic, the 
Premier of the province is a German Catholic and the two opposition 
parties are led by Je'tvs. 
But the ethnic majority was slow to make its political pm\'er felt. 
From 1920 1958, the names of the Premiers of the province and the 
Mayors of the city read like an Anglo-Saxon honour roll; Norris, Bracken, 
Garson, and Campbell for the province, and Farmer, Hebb, Haclean, Queen, 
Harriner, Coulter and Sharpe for the city. This 'vas due in part to 
one of the after-effects of the 1919 1-Jinnipeg Strike. Throughout that 
crisis, there was widespread vilification of "foreigners" and 'kgitators11 and 
the ethnic comrrillnity was generally fearful of entering politics. 20 
Iii the early 1950's ethnic representatives such as SlaH Rebchuk 
and Peter Taraska won city council seats in Hard 3 (the North End) but the 
year which really marked the first ethnic breachof Anglo-Saxon dominance 
was 1956 when Stephen Juba, a third-generation Canadian of Ukrainian origin, 
defeated G. E. Sharpe, the incumbent mayor. Only t<vo non-Anglo-Saxon 
candidates for Nayor had run prior to Forld Par II and Juba himself had been 
unsuccessful in 1952 and 1954. In 1956, however, Juba ~v-as presented vlith 
an issue concerning alleged misuse of public money and this gave him eno~gh 
11 good government" voters~ combined \vith his ethnic support, to defeat Sharpe. 
11. 
Juba carried Ward 3 by 11,000 votes and despite Sharpe receiving twice 
as many votes in Hard I (the South side), the Ukrainian was elected. 21 
Since his first victory, Juba has become almost a folk hero to many ethnic 
citizens and this combined with his great political skill, have made him 
almost unbeatable. Juba has expanded his political appeal beyond his 
ethnic base and in the Unicity mayoralty election he had a majority in 
all areas but it is his rock hard strength in the North End which has made 
him the most pov.rerful politician in Metropolitan Hinnipeg. 
This politican strength of the Mayor is an important factor. Stephen 
Juba believed in amalgamation and for fifteen years he carriedon acrusade 
in favour of one big city. Politicians come and go but Stephen Juba went on 
and eventually a provincial government that agreed with his objective came 
to pmver. 
The Early Years 
Economically Hinnipeg developed as a single unit but historically 
the various municipalities were created at different times. Some, such 
as Assiniboia and St. Boniface, had long and vivid histories, while others 
like Transcona, in 1912, were formed_for the more mundane reason of 
facilitating the establishment of a raih-1ay center. By 1924, fourteen 
municipalities had been created and this municipal structure did not change 
until 1960 when Hetro was formed. 
This formative period in Hinnipeg 's history sa'v many interesting 
events occur. In 1907, Hinnipeg experimented ;:.;rith its first t\vo level 
system of municipal government by initiating a board of control in addition 
to the city council. A referendum in 1918, hm.;ever, opposed the board and 
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it went out of existence •. In 1906 a referendum resulted in 2,382 
citizens voting in favour of a city-o•vned electrical plant with only 
382 opposed. In 1911, Hinnipeg Hydro began and for years Winnipeg had 
the cheapest power rate in the world. This experiment· in municipal 
socialism was also profitable; from 1961 to 1970, for example, the amounts 
transferred from hydro surpluses to the city's general treasury totalled 
$18.3 million. Over the years, there have been repeated suggestions that 
Winnipeg should share this largess with the other municipalities and as 
recently as 1971 the province hinted that Manitoba Hydro \vas interested 
in buying the city's operation but Hinnipeg Council continued to be 
violently opposed to any transfer. 
The event that changed the city's life, hmvever, was the Hinnipeg 
General Strike of 1919. Dividing the city into two armed camps, fifty 
years later the strike still polarized Hinnipegers. In the spring of 1969 
the Hinnipeg Local of the United Steelworkers presented a plaque to the 
city council commerating the fifteenth anniversary of th~ Strike. A 
tremendous debate ensued over the pro~riety of accepting the gift. As 
Professor J. E. Rea has written about the incident, "the furor came as 
no surprise to those familiar with the traditions of the city. The 
strike was the pivotal event of its history and has conditioned political 
l 'f . .,22 1 e ever sJ.nce. 
The background, events and repercussions of the strike have been 
23 
much discussed, and while the details cannot be discussed here, the meaning 
of the strike as suw..marized by Professor Rea is as follo-v;s; labour, 
led by radicals R. B. Russell and R. J. Johns, attempted a massive and 
permanent shift in economic po\·rer through the technique of the general 
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strike. The general strike was the major weapon of the One Big Union 
Movement, and labour was fiercely opposed by the Citizens Committee (composed 
of frantic businessmen), the Meig_hen Government and those who feared chaos 
and revolution. In June of 1919, the labour leaders ~vere arrested, riots 
broke out, troops Y.Tere used and the strike -.:vas broken. 
The result 1:vas a polarized, hostile, seething city and local 
politics quickly reflected the yaY.ming class division. On August 20, 
1919, 3,000 people gave enthusiastic support to the formation of the 
Citizens' League, ~1hich "tvould continue the -.:.rork of the Citizens' Committee 
of One Thousand. Labour formed the Dominion Labour Party and the Nove,.11ber 28 
Municipal Election was fought on the issue of the General Strike. Mayor 
Grey, the incumbent who had helped stamp out the strike, Has opposed by 
s. J. Farmer, the labour candidate. The Citizens' League placed ads saying,. 
"There is only one Issue -- Red or Hhite11 and vJith its usual impartiality, 
the Hanitoba Free Press carried editorials entitled, "Bolshie Pulls the 
Strings". 24 
Despite the backing of the nev7spapers, and business community, 
the League nearly lost the election. Mayor Grey defeated Farmer 15,630 
votes to 12,514, but the city council of fourteen 'tvas divided evenly. The 
polarization of the city was evident from the results; the League won in 
the more affluent areas of lvards 1, 2 and 3 while labour candidates \vere 
victorious in Hards 5, 6 and 7, the working-class North End. Hard 4, a 
mixed area, v7as narrowly -vmn by the League. It is doubtful, in fact, if 
the League ~rmuld have vmn at all if property qualifications, ~-1hich eliminated 
many lvorking-class immigrants, had not been in effect. (Non-resident 
property voters could also vote and labour claimed that voters were sent in from as 
14. 
far away as Chicago and Vancouver). 
Fearful of labour's electoral power, the League opted for the 
tried and true tactic of gerrymander. Robert Jacobs, an officer of the 
League, successfully persuaded the Provincial Legislat~re to adopt two 
amendments to the City Charter. The old 14 member council, based on 7 
wards, was replaced by an 18 member council based on 3 ""irds. The old 
'tvards of 5, 6 and 7, where labour's strength ~vas concentrated "tvas coalesced 
in Hard 3, while middle-class areas made up i·Jards 1 and 2. A measure of 
proportional representation 'vas adopted (which may have had the effect of 
confusing ethnic voters who ,.7ere used to the simple X) but plural voting, 
based on property ownership, was maintained. The Hanitoba Free Press 
estimated that in Hard 3·, the non-resident vote amounted to 10% of the 
electorate. 25 
The gerr;rmander worked. Although the labour candidate for mayor 
only lost by 931 votes out of a city-..,.:ride poll of 30,000, the League 'Jon 
twelve out of the 18 city council seats. 
A pattern -.:vas set in the 1919 and 1920 municipal elections which 
has held firm since that time. Every municipal election has seen a business 
oriented anti-labour Citizens' Committee, later called the Greater Hinnipeg 
Election Committee and now named the Independent Citizens' Election Committee, 
endorse candidates, provide funds and usually elect a majority of city 
council. These citizen election committees have been militant in their claim 
that they are independent and ha,re no ties v:rith the older political parties. 
Created during the era. of the Progressive's, "i•:rhen \·!estern suspicion of the 
older national parties was at its zenith, these citizens' election committees 
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have readily adopted the notion of U.S. municipal reformers that "party 
politics have no place at the local level11 • This anti-party bias has now 
become a strong Winnipeg civic tradition. 
But, in fact, the express purpose of these organizations since the 
1920's has been to prevent the election of a labour-dominated city council. 
The anti-socialist bias of the coalition is most clearly demonstrated 
after municipal elections when committee chairmanships and other plums are 
doled out. Labour candidates always have been denied important posts like 
Finance Chairman and after the October 1971 election~ not even a single riDP 
member ~vas allm¥ed to serve as a member of one of the council's standing 
committees. Generally the geographic divisions of 1919 have also held true 
Labour, CCF or NDP councilmen have come exclusively from the areas north of 
Portage Avenue. 
This early fusion of the anti-socialist elements at the local level 
was later repeated in the Manitoba legislature when a coalition was formed 
in 1935 to prevent labour dominance. Like the rural dominated legislatures, 
Citizen Election Committee members, on the t-1hole, were reluctant to extend 
social services, public housing, v:relfare or anything that might raise taxes. 
Both leaders of the province and the city \vere poured from the same mould --
conservative, business-oriented and Anglo-Saxon. It was a great time to be 
a H.A.S.P. 
As discussed above, the Strike also struck fear into the hearts of 
the ethnic community. Aliens, agitators and foreigners were held responsible, 
despite the fact that Dixon, Johns, Russell and the other leaders 'ivere of 
British origin. J. S. Hordm,;orth said that, "Hithout hesitation I say there 
was not a single foreigner in a position of leadership though foreigners 
16. 
' 26 were falsely arrested to give colour to this charge". The Meighen 
Government amended the Immigration Act to deport immigrants who had been 
convicted of seditious offences. 
Blamed for a strike inwhichthey had little part and shut out 
from the labour movement which was controlled by British workingmen, the 
ethnic community shyed away from politics -- particularly politics of a radical 
or left-wing hue. Tom Peterson in his excellent article on class and ethnic 
politics in Hardtoba quotes a Ukrainian editor as >rriting in 1932, " Canadian 
Ukrainians do not have any influence. We are poor and need political help. 
Ukrainian farmers and workers depend for their livelihood on the more 
powerful. This forces us to support a politically influential party. 
Affiliation with small radical parties brings us Ukrainians only disaster and 
• 11 27 ru1.n. 
~fuen members of the ethnic community at last became active at the local. 
level, following V-Jorld Har II, they tended to adopt the pro-business 
philosophy of the ruling group. Aldermen like Slmv Rebchuk or Peter T.araska, 
elected in 1950, \•:rere members of the Liberal Party. Steve Juba in nakin9' 
a virtue of the old independent anti-party tradition, has not been particularly 
interested in social welfare issues and has never taken positions threatening 
to the business community. Despite the relative poverty of many ~orth End 
residents, ethnic councillors, like the Hayor, fre.quently take more con-
sen~ative positions than their South Hinnipeg counterparts. Similarly, until 
the late sixties, the ethnic community \vorked through the traditional 
avenues of church, party and language associations and citizen groups were. very 
rare -- although ratepayers associations ~.Jere active in the suburbs. It '"as 
a 1-Jinnipeg version of the Negro King argument. 
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The Strike, then, was the key event shaping the parameters of the 
Winnipeg political culture. It divided the city into t"t.:ro distinct political 
areas. A local political association dedicated to keeping labour from 
council control and devoted to small "c" conservative positions, came to 
dominate the civic scene for the next fifty years. 
The Manitoba Club Syndrome, 28 in \·!hich Anglo-Saxon representatives 
from old businesses like Great Fest Life, Honarch Life, Investor 1 s Sy-ndicate 
and the Richardson interests 'l:vould meet with their counterparts from the 
provincial and local government to decide affairs, increasingly began to 
dominate the city's life. North \,Jinnipeg remained the centre of CCF-NDP 
strength provincially and vrell-knovm party members, like Stanley Know·les, 
Jack Blunberg, Lloyd Stinson and David Orliko-,..r \<Tere at one tine or another 
on the Hinnipeg Council. But, ethnic loyalities ~ained j_n important and 
ethnic/class interests often seemed to clash. The single most important 
politician from North Hinnipeg, Stephen Juba ~ in no vray threatened the 
econoJT,ic status quo. In short, until recently, i\Tinnipeg 1 s political 
temperature was lov:, its style crusty. 
The Coming of l~etro 
Prior to the creation of the Hetropolitan Corporation in 1Q60, 
the r.mnicipalities in the i·Jinnipeg region had co-operated in a wide v-ariety 
of services and several inter-municipal special bodies ,.;;ere founc~ed. The 
Hetro Corporation, in essence, centralized these bodies under one government 
and \vas given the revenue to carry out the needed pre gram expansions. 
18. 
The forma] special bodies included:· 
1. Greater Hinnipeg 1\fater District 1913 
2. Hosquito Abatement Authority 1927 
3. Greater Hinnipeg Sanitary District 1935 
4. St. James-'Hinnipeg Airport Commission 1937 
5. Hetropolitan Planning Connnission 1948 
6. Hetropolitan Civil Defence Board 1951 
7. Greater Hinnipeg Transit Commissio~ 1953 
There w·ere complaints from the municipalities that Hinnipeg 
dominated these boards unduly and in some cases such as the Greater Hinnipeg 
Hater District, there uere 'ride variations in service. But ,despite the 
difficulties, this long experience of inter-municipal co-operation, 
undoubtly aided the eventual emergence of Hetro. 
Perhaps the most important board \vas the Hetropolitan Planning 
Commission. The Commission had only an advisory function and as George 
R . h . 1 d. h . d f . 1 . • d 29 .1c , 1ts aeputy 1rector, .as po1nte out, most o 1ts pans went unneene . 
The board did, ho\vever, develop comprehensive schemes for 1\l'innipeg as a Hholc 
and more directly, Eric Thrift, the head of the Commission and George Rich, 
his deputy, actively and sometimes single-handedly, battled for the 
creation of an area-,.:ride government. The t-.;.;ro planners spoke to ~.romen' s 
groups, service clubs, employee associations and ethnic organizations --
al·ways extolling the advo.ntages of a Hetropolitan solution to Hinnipeg 1 s 
urban problems, They kept the Hetro ideo. in front of the eyes of \Vinnipeg 
politicians and the public generally. 
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Wnen Winnipeg's urban problems forced the Provincial government 
to finally intervene it was the Metro solution which was uppermost in 
everyone's mind. 
Following World War II, the expansion of the urban population in 
the Winnipeg region created the now familiar litany of urban problems. 
Expenditures soared; for example, the school debt of the City of 
Winnipeg rose from $1,419,952 in 1945 to $10,575,450 in 1956. Revenues were 
distributed unevenly; many of the industrial and warehouses settled in 
St. James providing that city with a heavy surplus, while Winnipeg went 
into debt. Assessment levels differed as much as 75% from municipality to 
municipality. 30 Because of the river system, there was a particular 
problem with bridges. Streets, bridges and recreational facilities Here 
paid for solely by the municipalities in which they were located and 
municipalities like St. James were loath to pay singly for a bridge hich 
everyone vmuld use. The municipalities were dumping ra-;v se,-Jage into the 
Red and Assiniboine Rivers with such gay abandonthat the rivers were 
literally stinking. The Shoal Lake aqueduct was over-taxed and water 
rationing ~vas common. In short, the Hinnipeg region suffered from a variety 
of problems ~vhich demanded an area-'tvide approach. 
As early as 1950, the seriousness of the above conditions led the 
·Manitoba Urban Association and the Union of Hanitoba Hunicipalities to 
request a major study into the urban problems of the Hinnipeg area. In 
November 1950, the Premier of Hanitoba, D. L. Campbell, responded to the 
demand and formed the Joint Provincial-Hunicipal Relations Committee, made 
f . f h d h . . 1 . . 31 up o representat1ves o t .e government an t.e mun1c1pa assoc1at1ons. 
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This Committee was the first of a staggering number of bodies to 
study local government in Hinnipeg. It heard briefs from the City of 
Hinnipeg, area municipalities and the formal associations "t;rhich all 
outlined the tremendous inoreasein costs which had occurred since 1945 and 
asked for the province to increase its grants and take over the more expensive 
32 functions, like health and welfare. The report of the Sub-Committee on 
Local Government in Hinnipeg, neatly analyzed the problem of the Hinnipeg 
region; "the whole area constitutes one integrated and interdependent 
unit based primarily upon the commercial, industrial, financial and trans-
portation facilities which serve the v1hole region"33 , but there was no 
corresponding political integration. The co-operative arrangement existed 
'l:;ras not satisfactory: 
Some municipalities have no representation 
on existingHetropolitan boards; the costs of 
some services, 'tvhich are of general benefit 
are not being appropriately shared; because 
it has not been possible to arrange for joint 
participation in financing, it has not been 
possible to carry out major projects which 
would be generally beneficial; through lack of 
effective co-ordination, some municipalities 
carry on procedures which damage the interest 
of the other municipalities in the Metropolitan 
3lf 
area." 
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The sub-committee recommended a single Metropolitan Board to 
replace all the special purpose bodies and this was supported in the 
final report of the Committee in February, 1953. The Premier, in a 
speech to the legislature on February 25, 1953 agreed that a Metropolitan 
Board "could result in increased efficiency and economy" and "the 
government is prepared, if the councils of the City of ·Hinnipeg and 
adjoining municipalities so advise, to bring in legislation for that 
35 
purpose. n· 
To no one's surprise, the municipal councils in the iJinnipeg 
area \vere not unanimous on the need for a Metropolitan Board, but once 
again everyone thought it vmuld be a great idea to study the problem. 
Accordingly, in 1955 the provincial government appointed the Greater 
Winnipeg Investigating Committee (CGIC), chaired by John Bodie, a 
Winnipeg businessman. C. N. Kushner, a Hinnipeg lawyer and later mayor 
of Hest Kildonan, became the secretary to the Committee and eventually 
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wrote the report. The appointment of the GPIC v;ras the catalyst 
\vhich led to the formation of Hetro. The creation of Hetro Toronto 
strongly influencedthe Commission andfrequent consultations were held 
'"'ith the Chairman., F. C. Gardner. Some system of Hetro seemed so 
inevitable that the briefs of the various municipalities dealt almost 
solely with -.;v-hat form the new council should take and \vhat functions 
37 it should perform. Only the City of Winnipeg pushed for amalgamation. 
In 1959, the GHIC published its Report. The Commission concluded 
that long-term planning 1:.-:ras impossible under the existing system and that 
an area-wide government was needed. The Commission recommended that 
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adjustment be made so that the 19 area municipalities would be in-
corporated into eight cities: Winnipeg, St. Boniface, St. James, 
St. Vital, Fort Garry, East Kildonan, Hest Kildonan, Transcona. The 
central council would consist of the mayors of the eight cities plus 
six other elected members. There 'tvas to be amalgamation of the fire 
and police departments and the Hetropolitan Corporation would assume 
responsibility for vlater, public transportation, sewage and drainage, 
airports, metropolitan hightvays and assessment. The Metro Corporation 
was to assume all of the duties of the special bodies and have the 
authority to determine what percentage in taxes each city would pay. The 
Metropolitan Corporation was also ·to establish a Hetropolitan School 
Board: this board was to select all school sites ar.d would control local 
board expenditures 'tvhile the local boards would have the right to appeal 
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any act1ons. 
The reaction to the GHIC report -vras mixed: in October of 1959, 
the City of Winnipeg, in a brief to the provincial government, declared 
that it was unalterably opposed to the creation of a metropolitan 
corporation. 39 Hany of the municipalities >vere also opposed to the ,,ride 
pm..-ers of the Hetro Corporation and the transfer of boundaries. It \vas 
no\v in the lap of the neH Conservative administration of Premier Duff Roblin. 
11etropolitan Government 
In the election of 1958, Duff Roblin had decisively beaten the 
Liberal regime of D. L. Campbell. The Conservative majority \·:as equally 
composed of ne-;;,:r found strength in the North, traditional Tory strength 
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in the rural areas and strong su1)port from the suburbs of Hinnipeg. 
The election had in fact divided the city the north going CCF and 
the south and outer suburbs, Conservative. The Premier 'tvas cautious 
but progressive and his government represented a welco~e change from 
the Campbell Liberals 'tvho had become obsessed 'tvith economy in Government 
and low taxes. 
Metro reform had not played any role in the election campaign 
but the government realized that something w-ould have to be done. The 
problems,which had been analyzed since 1953, had gotten worse and the 
publication of the GHIC Report '\17ould demand some sort of response. The 
Pra~ier personally took charge of the project. Villiam Johnston, the 
deputy minister of Hunicipal Affairs, 't·Jas mandated to come up 'tvith a plan. 
Mr. Johnston 'tvorked closely with Eric Thrift and other officials of the 
Planning Commission and again a delegation ,,,as sent to Hetro Toronto to 
assess the experiences of that body. The problem for the government, as 
stated by a senior offic:tal of the Roblin Hinistry, >vas hov7 to get "a 
ne1-1 form of government in a ;.;ray least likely to disrupt the situation". 40 
The Premier and his associates recognized that a vigorous, 
area-wide approach >vas needed to solve the region 1 s pro ble,-ns. Members of 
the government were also not impressed with the abundance of talent found 
in local council chambers and felt that nevl men \·rould be needed to make 
a Metro structure vmrk. Total amalgamation was analyzed as being politicially 
impossible and the implications of one big city representing half the 
Province worried many. The suburbs, which were strong areas of Conservative 
strength, also had to be placated, and suburban municipalities lvere 
opposed to the strong pat·7ers given Metro by the GVIC. 41 
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The result was a plan radically different from the Bodie Report. 
The government decided upon a minimal area-wide package and returned to 
the old idea of a Metropolitan Board - with added powers of planning 
which would replace existing special purpose bodies. The recommendation 
of the GHIC for a Hetro School Board and an amalgamated police force 
were dropped. Municipal boundaries 't\Tere also left alone. The make-up 
of the council was equally distinct. Instead of the expected provisions 
for municipal representation, the government proposed that all ten members 
of the Metropolitan Council be elected from special pie-shaped districts 
which would include both central and suburban areas. It was hoped that 
the small number of councillors would increase efficiency and that the 
type of district •·muld encourage area-wide thinking. One of the problems 
with Metro Toronto, the government believed, \vas that the representatives 
felt more loyalty to their home areas than to the central body. 
Bill 62, the Hetropolitan Hinnipeg Act, ~:vas introduced into 
the legislature on February 12 and assented to six ,,7eeks later on Harch 26, 
1960. The Premier, who had 1:vorked hard on the bill's creation, Has 
its most active defender in the House. The main provisions of the bill 
included the ten member boundaries described above, a preferential voting 
system, a chairman appointed by the Cabinet~rithsucceeding chairmen to be 
appointed by the council, and an Executive Director responsible for 
administration. The Corporation \vas given sole and full authority over 
all planning, zoning, and issuing of building permits; charged \-lith the 
responsibility of preparing a master plan that would include long-term 
planning for major roads (Hetro only had authority for Hetro streets, the 
25. 
City of Hinnipeg retained its traffic authority), bridges, transit, se'tv-er, 
water, garbage and major parks. In addition, the council was given 
many operational functions such as assessment, civil defence, mosquito 
abatement, flood protection, sewage disposal (but not collection) and 
water (excluding local distribution). 
Metro 'tvas to have four major revenue sources; direct levies on 
each municipal proportionate to the relation of the assessment of that 
municipality to the total assessment; direct fees; a share of the taxes 
on industry collected by local municipalities and the sale of debentures. 
The latter were subject to the approval of the Municipal Board if the 
amount exceeded $500,000. Ten municipalities were completely within 
'Hetro' s jurisdiction "t.J"ith nine more partly in the Metro area and the 
additional zone. (See Figure 2). 
I 
. 
The success of the government 1 s comproreise can be measured by 
the lack of conflict Bill 62 engendered. The basic principles of the 
bill, said Roblin, were the need for central planning and centralization 
of services. The only group to oppose the bill vigorously was the City 
of St. Boniface and its Hember of the Legislative Assembly, Larry 
Desjardins, ~.;rho feared for the French identity of his area. The Liberals, 
under D. L. Campbell, \-ranted a referendum on the issue. Host of the area 
municipalities agreed in principle \vith the establislunent of a tv70-tier 
system (a situation at least partially due to Hinnipeg 1 s insistence on 
total amalgamation), although many felt that Hetro 's planning pm·rers ~,;ere 
too broad and all ~.;ranted direct representation. The City of Uinnipeg 
attacked Hetro 's po•·:rers of zoning and land use and again stated that 
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amalgamation would be more efficient. Few interest groups submitted 
briefs and those that did appear before the Law Amendments Co~~ittee were 
in favour. In the end, only six members of the House, most of them 
rural Liberals, voted against the Bill. Initially, at.least, the 
Government had achieved its goal of little "disruption". 
A Decade of Conflict 
The history of the years 1960-1970 is one of unending disagreement, 
disharmony and disputes bet\vecn the Hayor of Winnipeg and the Metropolitan 
Corporation. The decade began with Hayer Juba declaring in 1961; 42 
ITWe have taken as much as 'ive can take ••• many people are having some serious 
second thoughts about 11etro. I am offering to lead this fight. I am 
ready to stand or fall on it ••• If I have learned anything about fighting, 
and I have, I will use it all if necessary. This is probably going to get 
rough". Hetro Councillor Robert Hoffat replied that the Hayor Has using his 
"favourite v7eapon"-- headlines at 4000 yards''43 The decade closed 'id.th 
the vendetta unabated. The Winnipeg Tribune, for example, on September 11, 
1969, contained an attack by the Hayor that "super governments, like Hetro, 
lead to duplication, inefficiency and \·7aste" to 'ivhich a Hetrr.:- Councillor 
returned, "If the Hayer has a policy-, it seems to he· one of continued opposition, 
·harrassment, obstructionism, irresponsibility and lack of co-operation to any working 
proposal or method of dealing with Hetropolitan problems. ,;44 
The battle was not merely verbal~ the tHo governments found it 
impossible to co-ordinate urban rene'i-7al policies, traffic policies 1-rere 
often at odds and on one occasion~ the City of Winnipeg even refused to 
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release its statistics on garbage pickup because Metro was doing a study 
on disposal. Metro councillors attacked the location of the Winnipeg 
City Hall while the mayor poured scorn on Metro's proposed Convention Centre. 
In the case of the Winnipeg Dovmtown Development proje~t~ each govern-
ment produced its mvn plans, group of developers and supporters. The 
intensity of the conflict often deadlocked urban policy and the provincial 
government finally was forced to intervene in 1970. As a senior Metro 
official has commented on the dismal record, "If \ve thought of it, 
TJ • • • d i b d d • II 45 .~1nn1peg sal.. t \vas a , an Vlce versa • 
In its battle with the mayor, Hetro had few political resources. 
Richard Bonnycastle, the Chairman appointed by Roblin in 1960, was a well-
kno-vm Hinnipeg businessman, a former President of the Hinnipeg Chamber of 
Corr®erce and a man with close associations to the Conservative Party. 
But he had never held public office before and the fact that he was an 
appointed official put him at a tremendous disadvantage vis-a-vis the 
46 
mayor. 
BonnycaEtle 's first job ;.;as to find high calibre staff to get 
Metro started. El~.;ood Bole left his job as head of the Municipal Board 
and became Executive Director of the Corporation. Bonnycastle and Bole 
put together a first-rate staff and ad111inistrat:iYely Metro Has an impressive 
success. But politically • try as he \vould, Bonnycastle was no match for 
the mayor. He once told a reporter that, "I used to >-rake up in the night 
and say to myself, 'Bonnycastle' ~.;rhat the devil have you gotten yourself 
into?"47To those i-7ho liked and admired him, the question w·as often repeated. 
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Metro suffered from a series of blows in the first year of 
operation from which it never really recovered. During that first year 
its image ,in' the minds of many of the public became fixed; it 't·ms 
blamed for a series of large tax increases; and the pr9vince retreated 
from supporting its own creation. 
The special electoral districts, designed to promote area-vride 
thinking, were an artiface with no correspondence to local feeling and 
as a political organization, the Metro level of government was the least 
visible political unit in Hinnipeg. Hith only 10 councillors for an 
area of half a million people, people found it. difficult to know 
their representative, and Hetro seemed to be a remote structure. The 
media, by giving extensive coverage to the city-Hetro conflict in one 
sense legitimized the struggle. Headlines from the first fet·J months of 
Hetro reveal the type of story citizens ,.;rere seeing: 
"Metro Horries City Personnel", Hinnipeg Free 
Press, November 28, 1960. 
"City, Hetro in Squabble on Streets", ·vinnipeg 
Tribune, December 5, 1961. 
"Kushner and Juba Attack Metron, Pinnipeg 
Tribune, January 7, 1961. 
11No One Takes Neutral Stand About Metro", 
~·Jinnipeg Tribune, May 10, 1961. 
11Juba Hades in Hire, Emerges Like Rose", 
Hinnipeg Free Press, Hay 12, 1961. 
"Too Much Squabbling", Hinnipeg Free Press, 
June l, 1961. 
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"Juba Bares Fists for Metro Attack", 
Winnipeg Free Press, June 3, 1961. 
The general impression given was one of constant bickering and 
conflict and Metro received much of the blame. But the most damaging 
and lasting impression of Metro was that it was responsible for Hinnipeg's 
large tax increase of 1961. Hinnipeg 's mill rate had held steady bett·7een 
43 and 44 mills since 1951. But in 1961, the city was forced to increase 
its budget by over 13 million dollars and the mill rate "tvent up 7 points. 
The creation of Hetro and the increase in taxes in the same year tv-as 
too good an opportunity to be missed and the mayor happily blamed the whole 
thing on the nei'' government. The Hinnipeg Free Press carried a detailed 
study of the figures tvhich sho<vJed that despite the fact that Hetro had 
taken over services which had formerly cost Winnipeg $2,300,000, the 
city's budget \vas only dovm $300,000. The mayor and city bureaucrats 
had been umrilling to reduce their staff empires and thus 57% of the in-
crease was due to ·Hinnipeg spending. Education costs had finally caught 
up and accounted for 37% with Metro's increased levy being only 10% of 
. 1 48 tne tota • Yet, despite the publication of the above figures and the 
explanation of Hetro spokesmen, the general impression continued to be 
that 1-Ietro ivas responsible for higher taxes. The tax issue of 1961 became 
the first of many such incidents. From that time omvard, the remote and 
aL.-uost politically hapless Hetro becane the favourite 't·l'hipping boy of 
city and suburban politicians alike -- if things were going badly, it 
was Hetro's fault. 
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Netro's one hope in these early years of conflict was visible 
support of the provincial government. This was not forthcoming. And 
as George Rich, the former planning director of Metro, has 'vritten, "This 
lukewarm attitude of the provincial government seemed only to encourage 
h . i 1 k f f h 1 d i . d f 1 . !'49 t e cr1t cs to oo . or urt er rea an mag1ne causes or camp a1nt. · 
The province gave Metro a transition grant of only a little more than 
$100,000 which forced the Corporation to immediately raise taxes. The 
Premier next stated that Metro would receive no special consideration and 
would be treated like any other municipality. During 1961, v!hen Metro 
was being roasted from one end of the city to the other, the Premier 
was silent and even on one occasion said he agreed Pith critics that 
1f f IT • 50 Metro had gone too .ast in taking over serv1ces. Bernie Folfe gave 
expression to the general feeling along Metro councillors that they had 
been let dmv-n) "the Premier has been politically irresponsible in my 
"51 
view :._n thro-v1ing Hetro to the ~<J>olves with no verbal or financial support. 
By 1962~ an election year, Metro had become a source of acute 
political embarrassment for the government. A columnist for the VJinnipeg 
Tribune ·wrote that, "on Hetro government members and the opposition 
recognized that the Rcblin Conservatives were facing a very 1·eal election 
issue." 52 
The provincial government sa;:v- its creation disliked by the public, 
hated by the Hayor of T.Jinnipeg and opposed by the municipalities. Rather 
than expend its political capital in a defence of Metro, the government 
skillfully retreated. Section 210 of the Hetropolitan Hinnipeg Act called 
31. 
for a review of Metro in 1965. The gover~~ent moved this date up and 
established the Greater Hinnipeg Review Commission on October 2, 1962. 
Criticism of Metro lessened after the Commission began its work and the 
~overnment temporarily was "off the hook". It was to resort to a 
...) 
similar strategy four years later. 
The three man commission, chaired by Lorne Cumming \vho had 
'tvritten the well-knmm Cumming Report advocating Toronto Metro, reported 
in February, 1964 and made numerous recommendations which they described 
as "relating to technical matters". In their briefs to the Comllission the 
area municipalities ·were united on three basic points: 
1. No direct representation on the Metro Council; 
2. Confusion about planning andinequality of assessment; 
3. Lack of local funds: payments to education and Metro often took 
up to 75% of a municipal budget leaving little room for local 
initiative. 
The Commission ignored many of the complaints of the municipalities and 
only in the areas of planning and assessment did the Commission recommend 
important chanr,es. 
One of t:i.1e main recolTh.-nendations of the Commission \·m.s that business 
assessment ,;.;rould be subject to the same mill rate as real property. This 
recommendation had the effect of removing from the municipalities the 
option of choosing bet~veen the assessment of personal property or the levy 
of a business tax. The Commission helped clear up some of the confusion 
about planning by giving municipalities the right to appeal Metro decisions 
or proposals on planning to the Municipal Board. These recommendations 
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were adopted in 1964. The Commission also recommended changes in the 
boundaries of the municipalities. At the time of incorporation, nine 
municipalities were wholly within the metropolitan area boundaries and 
ten were partly ,;vithin. (See Figure 3). Follov7ing the.Review Commission 1 s 
recommendations, five rural municipalities (Rosser, Macdonald, East St. 
Paul, West St. Paul and Springfield) '<7ere '1-rithdra-.;m from the metropolitan 
area and two that had been. partly ~vi. thin the boundaries 'tvere TIO\\T totally 
included (Fort Garry and St. Vital). After the Tmm of Brooklands merged 
with the city of St. James in January 1, 1967, there were ten municipalities 
vrholly and three partially 't·:rithin :Hetropolitan 1-Jinnipeg for an area of 
On the basic question of the usefulness of Hetro, the Review 
Comrnission stated, "We have no hesitation in finding that on the whole 
the basic advantages of the local gover~~ent system established by the 
Act have been demonstrated beyond question even at this early date ••. we 
have found no justifiable grounds for criticism and no real defects in 
h . 1 d . . . . . ll 53 t e ~nterna a m1n1strat1ve organ1zat1on • Hetro lauded the report 
as a vindication for its efforts but the Commission had not come to grips 
with any of the complaints - in particular the is~te of municipality 
representation on the Hetro Counc::n, ;=r:1d the implementation of the Commission 1 s 
recommendations did nothing to defuse the political situation. This was 
demonstrated in 1964 'tvhen Nayor Juba held a referendum on Metro; the 
results ivere not binding in any way but the outcome ~vas embarrasing. To 
the question of \.rhether Hetro should be abolished, 28,389 Hinnipeg citizens 
voted yes and only 12,053 said no. The referendum also asked vrhether the 
citizens wanted total amalgamation with 25,049 in the affirmative and 
---~-·--~-----------------------
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15,179 opposed. 
In 1966, Premier Roblin again tried to get rid of his Metro 
problems by giving it to a Commission to study. On August 18, 1966, the 
Local Government Boundaries Commission was created. Tlle Commission ~·JaS 
chaired by Robert Smellie, the former Conservative Min.ister of Municipal 
Affairs and contained such local government notables as Stephen Juba and 
Els\vood Bole. C. N. Kushner resumed· his familiar role as secretary to 
a Local Government Commission. The Commission ·was to study the territory 
and boundaries of existing local government units and other matters con-
sidered relevant to the establishment of viable local government units. 
From 1966 - 1968 the Commission spent most of its time studying 
education boundaries but in that year it began an extensive program of 
research on Hetropolitan Hinnipeg. It studied the costs of total 
amalgamation, different types of local government structures, and the 
factors vJhich make up a corrllllunity. During the time of the Commission's 
research, Hetro and Hinnipeg embarked on their bitter fight over the 
Convention Centre for dovmto\m development and the N.D.P. defeated the 
Conservatives in the June 1969 election. In 1968, Duff Roblin had retired 
from politics after being defeated in the federal election of that year. 
He was replaced as Premier by Halter I.Jeir, an undertaker from Minnedosa, 
\vho appropriately enough oversa>;·l the demise of the Conservative Government. 
The N.D.P. had long favored total amalgamation and the change of 7,overrrment 
radically altered the possibility of real reform. By September, 1970, the 
Commission had completed its report (•:.Jhich Hayor Juba refused to sign) 
but the Schreyer administration had by then formulated its oHn plan. 
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In the main, the Commission's recommendatior.s were similar to 
those of the 1959 Greater Winnipeg Investigating Commission. The G.W.L c. 
had wanted eight cities, the Local Boundaries Commission wanted nine: 
Winnipeg, Fort Garry, St. Vital, St. Boniface, Transcona, St. James-Assiniboia, 
Tuxedo-Charles"tolOod, Old Kildonan-~.Jest Kildonan and North Kildonan-East 
Kildonan-Elmwood. The Metro Council would be composed of the mayors and 
aldermen of the nine cities plus ten directly elected representatives. 
Amalgamation of the police and fire forces '\".Jas rejected but again, like 
the G. \i. I. C. , a Metro School Board ~·:ras proposed. The Local Boundaries 
Commission then, favoured the constant demand of the area municipalities 
that there be direct representation on the Hetro Council but events had 
already passed the Commission by. In summary, the three local government 
commissions 1vere useful devices to defuse criticism but the Provincial 
Governments 'ivere not very inclined to implement the recommendations. 
Evaluation of Hetro. 
:Hetro clearly was not a political success. Faced 'Hith a pov:erful 
opponent vho took advantage of every opportunity to belittle it, possess-
ing fe\•7 political resources on its O'im and \·7ith little backing from the 
provincial government which had established it, the Hetropolitan Corporation 
became a misunderstood and disliked structure. However, it had many 
concrete achiever.lents; as the 1970 Local Boundaries Com..'Tlission noted, ''the 
crisis situation Hhich existed in 1960 in connection 'tJith many of the 
. ..54 
area-·hride or inter-municipal services no longer ex1sts." 
In the area of planning, Bill 62 proYided that Hetro v7aS to prepare 
a Haster Development Plan. A first draft vras completed in 1963-64 but 
was changed after the Cummings Commission. In 1966, after a second series 
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of public meetings, a plan 't¥as formulated and several outside consultants 
were invited to give a second opinion. Again, after several changes 
the plan ;;.;ras adopted by Hetro and approved by 11inister of Hunicipal 
Affairs in 1968. In 1971, Bill 36 stated that the Hetropolitan Develop-
ment Plan was to be approved Greater Hinnipeg Development Plan. Metro 
was the first local goverr~ent body to subsidize public transit from 
area ¥7ide taxes and several bridges r..,ere constructed. Sunnner rationing 
of \vater became a thing of the past and Hetro built' enough plants to 
treat all I.Jinnipeg se\vage. Tn 1960 the difference in assessments 't-7aS 
sometimes as much as 75%. r.ut by 1965 Hetro had completed a total area 
wide reassessment on a uniform basis. Finally, in the area of parks, 
in 1960 1'1etropolitan v7innipeg had only 15 acres but by 1970 this had 
been increased to 2,040 acres. 
The greatest effect of Hetro thoug~ uas to change attitudes on 
the desirability of re-organizing local government for Vinnipeg. In 1960, 
total amalgamation .seer:1ed incomprehensible as a solution to Hinnipeg's 
problem and the creating of a t>·JO-tier system seemed to be a large step. 
By 1970, people ¥Jere used to are2 F:Lck government and Hetro had proved 
that amalgamation \vas at least technically feasible. Indeed it is some-
;;.;rhat ironic that Hayer Juba has had to use the old Hetro administrators 
to run his Unicity. In 1968 the Hetro Council T,vent on record favouring 
amalgamation, the Conunission on ::fanitoba 1 s Economic Prospects recommended 
one city for the Hetro area and in a debate in the Provincial I,egislature 
both the NDP and the Liberal Party supported unification of the area 
municipalities. By one standard, lfetro \·:as so successful in making: the 
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the case for area wide government that there was never any 
question of returning to the pre 1960 era and the issue was simply 
whether to move forv1ard or not. From this perspective it can be argued 
that Metro was only an evolutionary step on the vray to unification. 
But if Metro promoted unification by showing that it was feasible, 
Mayor Juba certainly forced the issue. The political \rrangling and 
constant bickering bet1;·1een Hetro and the City of Hinnipeg seemed to 
foreclose. the possibility that the two governments ~;,muld even co-operate 
fully--and co-operation vras needed for shared jurisdictions like urhan 
rene-vml and development generally. If ~{etro had }een as r.mch of a 
political success as it '\,;as an adNinistrative one there uould have been 
little dei"land for a netv city structure. Hayqr Juba, by his poFer, skill 
and obstinacy kept the amalgamation issue before the public anc1. the 
senior government. Netro Nay have ensured that 1)innipep: \·muld nsver 
return to the fragmented system of pre 1960 but Hayer Juba was the 
single individual most responsible for making Hinnipeg one big city. 
Part II 
The Unicity Concept 
The surprise election of the Net-1 Democratic Party in June 1969 
made reform of the local government structure. in h'innipeg inevitable. The 
riDP had been the third largest party in the legislature with virtua.lJ.y all 
their members corning from \·!innipeg. The NDP is a party committed to change 
and more effective public institutions and this coupled \vith the S\·ritch 
from a suburban-rural party to a central city party led ultinately to 
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Bill 36. The 1969 election savr the city and province polarized; the 
Conservatives held the rural south, south Hinnipeg and the suburbs, the 
NDP-northern Hanitoba and north and central Winnipeg. The NDP, led by 
its two most prominent urQan spokesmen - Sidney Green and Saul Cherniack 
both former Hetro councillors, had long favoured amalgamation. Most of 
the social ills associated with urban life accumulated in the do,mtmm 
core while many of the richest sources of revenue 'Here located in the 
suburbs. Amalgamation vmuld result in more equitable distribution of 
the costs and resources. The NDP was the party of the central city and 
as Bernie 1\Tol~ vice chairnan of the Hetropolitan Corporation, 'Hrote' in Q 
brief, "no surprise should be registered at the determination of the 
present government 1 s decision to proceed ~.rith restructuring regional 
government in the Hetropolitan \.Jinnipeg area" .55 
At the time of the upset victory, Robert Smellie and the other 
mei11bers of the local Boundaries Com.rnission offered their resignation to 
the newly formed Provincial Government. Premier Schreyer refused to 
accept the offer and asked the Connission to continue working. However, 
it soon became evident that the proposals of the Commission and the 
inclinations of the Government were at odds. In 1970 the Government asked 
Dr. Heyer Brownstone to begin working on a scheme of unification. 
Brownstone, a native of Hinnipeg, had vrorked fo_r the CCF government 
in Saskatchewan from 1947 - 64. Beginning as an agricultural economist, 
he had directed the research of the 1955 Saskatchewan Royal Commission 
on Rural Life much of v7hich was concerned 'tvith local government in 
rural areas - and eventually became deputy-minister of Hunicipal 
Affairs, The 1955 Saskatchewan Royal Cotnmission had emphasized the 
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need for citizen access t-7ithin the decision-making process and 
Browntree was known as an advocate of grass roots participation. Saul 
Cherniack and Sidney Green supplied the impetus for unfication--they had 
both argued for it ~vhile on the Metro Council--but Bro-vmstone ivas 
primarily responsible for the other main thrust of Bill 36 - the encour-
agement of citizen participation and political decentralization. Brownstone 
put a team of consultants together which included Lionel Feldman and 
Dennis Hefferon and actively began \vork in the summer of 1970. 
During the fall of 1970 the Brm·mstone recornJTIPndations -v1ent to 
the Cabinet. There 'i•Tas definite controversy ,,rithin the Cabinet 
over the Broi,rnstone proposals and many -vrere eventually changed. One 
highly placed source has said "what •·ms left out of the Fhite Paper is 
more important than \·lhat remains". 56 The main issue of contention 
apparently i·ms over the continued existence of the local municipalities. 
The main proponents Here Cherniack and Green on one side and Al Hackling, 
the Attorney-General and a former alderman for St.James, and Saul ~·Hller, 
Education Hinister, and former mayor of East Kildonan on the other. 
This "Hiller-Hackling -- Cherniack-Green" confrontation pitted the 
suburban representatives against the supporters of analgamation. The 
iTTJ.passe \•!aS resolved \vith the cor:1promise of the community com!'littee. 
Bill 36, in fact, is an excellent examnle of the compronise~it allowed 
a suburban member to emphasize the community committee and a central 
city representative to praise unification. In the debate on Bill 36, 
for example, Frank Johnstone, the Conservative f-femher for Sturgeon 
Creek, attacked the "hypocrisy" sh01m by Hr. J'fackling in preaching the 
"evils of total amalgamation for six years as St. James alderman" and 
then supporting the bill. The Attorney-General replied to the attack 
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by arguing that Bill 36 uas not amalgamation but rather ''regional 
government and a series of community committees."57 
Although the report of the local Boundaries Commission had been 
submitted in September, the government held up its publication until 
the Cabinet had decided on an alternative plan. Finally, in late 
December the local Boundaries report was released and a \·reek later on 
December 22, 1970 the \·:'hite Paper Proposals for Urban Re-organization 
Has unveiled. Mr. Cherniack uho had been designated Hinister of 
Urban Affairs, said the report \·las a "vrholly neP approach" Hhich 
would continue the efficiency of centralization uith more citizen 
participation. The Premier, for his part enmhasized that the Phite 
Paper meant one city hut '\:ith provision for recognizing existing 
c~mmunitiesn.53 
The Con~t Examined 
The I·Jhite Paper analyzed Greater Hinnipeg' s urban problems 
and came to the conclusion that "almost all of the urhan area's 
difficulties stem in ·Hhole or in part, from three main roots--frag-
mented authority, segmented financial capacity and lack of citizen 
involvement". 59 The solution prouosed ·Has a bold combination of 
unification of the municipalities and de-centralization of the political 
process. 
The Hhite Paper can be conveniently sub-divided into the sections dealing 
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with: 
1. Unification 
2. Political structure 
3. Municipal administration 
4. Participation 
5. Provincial-local relations 
Unification 
The govern111ent proposed to create one city. The t;.relve municipalities 
would cease to exist and there i.Jould be one central council. The unified 
council would be the exclusive laH-making body responsible for all programs, 
budgets and for relationships ,.;rith other governments. The government 
hoped that a unified council would end citizen confusion over i·7hat authority 
was responsible for uhatfunction, prevent the inequitable exploitation 
of the tax base, distribute services more fairly and plan more effectively. 
As a first step in creating one city, the Hhite Paper proposed that 
the mill rates of the municipalities be uniform. Under this formula most 
of the area municipalities and the city of Hinnipeg -.;.;rould experience a 
decrease but the richer suburbs of Charles;.;ood, !'Torth Kildonan, St. James-
Assiniboia and Tuxedo 1.:rould pay more. One of the najor issues connected 
v.rith the unification proposal Has the question of hm·J much the neH structure 
would cost. Robert Smellie, JUs\·IOOd Bole and many others argued that 
unification costs uould climb drastically (and it makes sense that the 
policemen in Brooklands \vould nou demand the same as their ~.:innipeg 
counterparts, i.e. costs '.:rould level up to the highest denominator). l-[r. 
Bole, in fact, estimated that most citizens 1,7ould pay a hundred dollars T'lore 
in taxes a fe1v years after the amalgamation. 60 
41. 
Earl Levin, the Directorof Planning for Metro and Ellen Gallagher, 
Mr. Cherniack's executive·assistant countered this cost argument in a 
series of speeches and articles that made the point that the Government 
had not amalgamated to save money but rather to increase the effectiveness 
of local government through better area-wide planning, distribution of 
services, etc. 
Political Structure 
To govern Unicity, the \,Jhite Paper proposed a 48 member central 
council elected from single memher \·7ards vJith the mayor chairman of 
the council. In essence the 1,Jhite Paper proposed to create a Parlia-
mentary I Cabinet system of government. The government '\vas opposed 
to direct election of the mayor for "area-wide election of the mayor 
\vould in our view not merely dilute the supremacy of the popularly 
elected council but leave ambiguous the question of "tvho is really 
responsible, the Council or the lfayor", (p. 27). The government eventually 
retreated from this proposal and many observers are no·w asking the 
same question posed in the Hhite Paper about the nev.T Hinnipeg Council. 
The jovernment adopted the traditional committee system of local 
government, but here too it made changes. The Hhite Paper proposed 
to create a central executive committee composed of the mayor and 
the other committee chairmen. The Executive Committee vrould be the 
overall policy arm of the council and there v:ould he three admini-
strative committees: Planning and Development, Finance, and i·~orks 
and Operations. Each of the administrative committees would have six 
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or more councillors and the administrative departments would report to 
the Council through these committees. 
Hunicipal Administration 
The municipal administration selected 't\7as the Board of Commissioners 
system, found in Calgary, Edmonton and Vancouver. The Board of Commission-
ers would be chaired by a chief Commissioner and have as its members the 
various commissioners of the executive departments. The Board of 
Commissioners would supervise the city administration and make policy 
recommendations to the council through the policy committees. The 
unification of the bureaucracy frightened some observers. James Lorimer 
wrote about the \mite Paper: 
"The government's plans for community committees does not 
implement their preferred-desire to generate citizen involve-
ment but the other aspects of the policy proposal do very 
effectively centralize pov7er, increase the effectiveness 
of the bureaucracy and in general 'tvill make the vmrk of 
citizens trying to make their views heard at City Hall 
that mueh more difficult". 61 
Political Participation 
The decision to create 48 member ,.;rards 'tvas the direct result 
of the government's desire to increase citizen_access. The ~mite Paper 
proposed to have one councillor for every 10 - 12,000 people. 
The v7ards in fact are probably more of a cormnunity than the areas 
contained in the Community Connnittees. They are smaller in scale and 
tend to group pople Pho fall in similar economic and social calibers. 
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The large number of wards, however, clearly makes it imperative 
that there be some informal means of organizing the council. Implicit 
in the White Paper proposals is the hope that party politics would come 
to the Greater Winnipeg area. The cabinet-type of gover~ent envisioned 
in the vfuite Paper merely gives form expression to this hope. One of 
the major issues of the fight over Bill 36 \vas on the charge that the 
NDP hope to win a majority of 1{DP members on the regional council and 
had structured the v.rards to bring this about. Hmvever, in an examina-
tion of the issue of party politics at the local level, Bill Burdeyny, 
the suburban editor of the 1~innipeg Tribune found that out of the 112 
local council members in Hetropolitan ·E'innipeg prior to the passage of 
Bill 36 only 12 '"'ere members of the NDP. 62 Realizing this fact several 
members of the Cabinet w·ere less than sanguine about the party prospects 
at the local level. After the election of October 6, in Hhich the liDP 
\·JOnd only 7 out of the 39 seats it contested, Premier Schreyer said 
he was surprised at the result but that he had never felt the party 
-.:-rould do well. 63 Thusi,it ,,Tas a desire to increase participation not 
to improve partisan gain ~.rhich prompted the creation of a large nuTilber 
of v.mrds, although party officials naturally tried to take advantage 
-of the situation after Bill 36- vias passed. 
The most innovative participatory device was the concept of the 
community cornmittee. These committees Here to be the key link bet\·7een 
the citizen and the nevr council. The committees v.rere to be composed 
of the councillors from the vards Hi thin their boundaries, i.e. in one 
sense they ·uere area committees of council. The \<fnite Paper proposed 
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to create 8 community committees ,,Thich largely corresponded to the 
existing municipalities. 64 
Community committees were to have the administrative responsi-
bility for local services like community centres, parks and libraries 
but the Hhite Paper emphasized "their most important function by far 
will be to provide ready access by the people to the local government 
system", (P. 36). Community committees were expected to 
1) maintain close communication with local citizens 
2) spur citizens to discuss and develop ideas on policy 
3) conduct appeal activities (e. g. Board of Adjustment functions) 
Formal community conferences of the citizens in the area \•Tere to 
called once or twice a year and on issues affecting the area, officials 
of the regional government were to explain their progress to the citizens 
and hear the electer 1 s vie\vS at first hand. The Hhite Paper maintained 
that llthe avenues of political a(:cess 1;dll have been opened, and if 
openess is exhibited, citizens in our vie~J 'tvill respond", (P. 43). 
Provincial-Local Relations 
One of the least noted aspects of the Hhite Paper but potentially 
one of the most important was the design for a ne\·l provincial-local 
relationship. The Hhite Paper called for a "parallel and complementary 
re-organization at the provincial level to ensure that the autonomy 
and integrety of the new local government is not merely maintained but 
strengthened", (P. 44). A nevJ Department of Urban Affairs was to be 
created -vdth the responsibility for scanning and co-ordinating all 
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provincial department programs. The province was nm~ committed to 
developing an urban policy tovmrds Hinnipeg rather than a health 
policy, transportation policy, etc. One device to help this coherent 
focussing was a system of urban accounts which would record all public 
activities in the vJinnipeg region and analyze the effects of the progress 
of the urban environment. 
In response to the problems of Hetro Hinnipeg and the years of 
conflict and deadlock the Government proposed an innovative solution 
which in part 't·Jas frankly experimental. At one stroke the Schreyer 
administration planned to unify the city and introduce party politics 
at the local level--two issues -,;.;rhich had divided the city for years. 
The \fuite Paper 't·7as the opening shot in a battle which dominated pro-
vincial politics for the next six months. 
Part III 
The Adoption of Bill 36 
The political battle over Bill 36 can be divided into t\·70 phases: 
in the first or 'Phite Paper stage the government maintained that it -v;as 
not irrevocably \\Tedded to the 1fuite Paper proposals and it gingerly 
explored public reaction through a series of tmm hall meetings. It knm·7 
that the area municipalities \vould be opposed but the basic question 
was hOiv the public -.:..;rould respond. Hould the Hhite Paper develop into a 
major public issue like the 1970 dispute over automobile insurance or 
were the municipal councils and bureaucracies really representing only 
themselves? 
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The opponents of the \ihite Paper tried to broaden the dispute 
sufficiently to force the Government to retreat. This attempt failed. 
The second phase of Bill 36 occurred after the Government had presented 
the Bill to the legislature. At this point, the arena-of conflict 
was transferred from public meetings to the legislature. The opposition 
now attempted to change particular parts of the Bill and 
build up points to be used ·against the liDP in the October council 
election. 'By phase t'tvO the '\var'' had heen lost hut severA-l 
tactical "battles" remained to be fought. 
The Preliminary Haneuvers 
The technique of issuing a 1)hite Paper \•TaS a wise move by the 
government. It allm.red them to present several controversial ideas 
without being completely committed to the program. It gave an oppor-
tunity to test public opinion and see the resources of their opponents 
before they actually drafted the bill, and to make adjustments on 
matters of detail. Hany times during the next few months various 
cabinet members said that the Government i·muld change some aspects 
of the "hThite Paper. For example on February 25, Hr. Cherniack said 
that the government Has not "married" to the planned reorganization.65 
This approach of the government gave the impression that it \vas 
open-minded and receptive to the d~~ands of the public. There is some 
doubt hovJ far the government \·muld have retreated, and the bill ~;hich 
was eventually presented to the legislature differed little from the 
\~ite Paper. But the government did change some non-essential aspects 
\vhich belied the opposition charp:es of ''dictatorial". The use of the 
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~fuite Paper and the series of public meetings also extended the Unicity 
issue over a long period of time which helped defuse the emotional 
aspects of the debate. 
The initial reaction to the Hhite Paper varied. Most represen-
tatives stated that they hadn't time to read the document yet. But both 
Stephen Juba and Jack Hillis, the Chairmen of :Hetro, '.:relcomed the plan 
while the Hayor of Charleswood, l>...rthur T. Houg' s reaction '"as "it's 
lousy!!. 66 Hm.rever, ~.;rithin a few weeks the opposition began to form 
and by February the different camps could be clearly delineated. On 
January 4, 1971, D. A. Yanofsky, mayor of Fest Kildonan ,,rrote in 
the Hinnipeg Free Press the first of a series of articles examining 
the government 1 s plan. In these articles Hayor Yanofsky questioned 
the need for a large central council and said it 't·rould bring party 
politics to the Greater Hinnipeg area. He also questioned the need 
to disrupt all of Greater Pinnipeg in order to solve the financial 
problems of the city of Winnipeg. Soon the various area municipalities 
began to publicly oppose the plan. On January 13, Fort Garry municipal 
council declared an "all out fight" against the Hhite Paper and the 
next day the council of St. Vital followed suit. Suburban rmP members 
like Attorney-Geneneral Al Hackling ·Here attacked. The local St. James 
paper said Hackling was the "pall bearer at the death of St. James-
Assiniboia. 6 7 
On January 21, the area municipalities grouped together to form 
a common front against the Government. Nayor R. A. Hankling of Fort 
Garry called the meeting and ten of the area's tv.Telve municipalities 
,.,;ere opposed to the urban re-organization policy. Hayer Stephen Juba 
Has not invited to the meetings because of his kno"m support for 
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amalgamation and only Mayor Stanley Dowhen of East Kildonan favoured 
the central city concept. The mayors agreed to meet jointly to propose 
alternatives to the plan and coordinate their attacks. In the legis-
lature, the Conservative Party ~-!as the strongest opponent of Unicity. 
Prominent spokesmen like Els\.rood Bole, former executive director of 
Hetro and Robert Smellie, Chairman of the Local Boundaries Commission, 
kept up a steady attack on the 1\fhite Paper. 
The government 'tvhile receiving feH outright endorsations of its 
proposals, received general support from the City of T,Jinnipeg and the 
Hetropolitan corporation. Each of these government, -,;.:rhile asking for 
specific changes (Hayer Juba in particular "tvanted a directly elected 
mayor) gave the Province their support rrin principle". The Hinnipeg 
newspapers, unlike almost every other issue in Hanitoba politics, 
·were strangely mute on the government's plan. The 1?innipeg Free Press 
had long supported amalgamation and Saul Cherniack v7o:s one of the fe\v 
ministers who had not been criticized by the nev7spaper. 
Since the paper supported the idea but opposed the government it 
remained silent. The Hinnipeg Tribune raised several questions about 
Unicity but "on balance it appears that the concept of c>.rnalg:amation of 
the present twelve municipalities into one city has merited support".68 
The Hhite Paper also received support from the few associations or 
interests concerned >vith municipal politics. The Dm-mtmm Business 
Association and the 1.Jinnipeg Chamber of Comrr.erce raised queries about 
certain aspects of unification but basically believed that amalgamation 
vmuld be good for business. On January 26, 1971 the Hinnipeg Free Press 
49. 
reported that C. J. Rogers, president of the Downto>vn Business group 
said that the 1·fuite Paper '1:-Jas "reasonably compatible with 'tvhat '.Ye have 
in mind". Other supporters of the government included Lloyd Axworthy, 
director of the Institute of Urban Studies 'tvho said that the opposition 
to one-city was nonsense,69 and the Hanitoba Association of Architects 
who also favoured a single-authority government. 
One significant source of support for the Government came from 
the Municipal Employees Unaion. Ap~from the elected members of the 
local councils, the municpal employees \·Jere the group most concerned 
with the proposed re-organization. Hr. Cherniack announced that all 
existing employees 1·rould be guaranteed their job, although there might 
be some change in position. Ee also stated that the pay of the employees 
would remain at their present level and that "no employees ·Hould suffer 
a loss of rights because of the change". Representatives of the 
Canadian Union of Public Employees responded with a brie~ in support 
of the government a.nd R. A. Henderson, Prairie Director of CUPE said 
the union 't·ms "not impressed by the local politician's internal 
politics of self-preservation".70 By guaranteeing the jobs of the 
municipal union and the local officials, Hr. Cherniack secured 
the support or at least the neutrality of one-of the few groups 
pm;rerful enough to offer significant opposition to 'the 1\Thite Paper. 
Hithin a month of the introduction of the Hhite Paper the 
opposing sides co~ld be clearly seen. In January, Hr. Cherniack 
announced that the government ·would hold eleven public meetings 
from January 22 to February 24 to explain in detail the Unicity concept 
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and listen to the public 1 s vie't·7S. Hith the suburban opposition crystal-
izing at the January 21 meeting of mayors, the real forum of conflict 
shifted to these public meetings. 
The Public Debate 
The opponents of Unicity attempted to use the public meetings 
as a demonstration to the government of the unpopularlity of the \fhite 
Paper. The various municipal councils urged their citizens to attend 
and sent propaganda to the voters. The council of Fort Garry, for 
example, prepared a sheet \·rhich stated on its title page in bold, black 
type: YOU HILL LOSE: 
Y01JR HUNICIPAL IDE1:1'TITY 
YOUR TAX RESERVES 
YOUR LOCAL REPRESENTATION 
YOUR COJ.ilUJNITY CONTROL 
Other councils openly aided citizens groups ·who had formed to oppose the 
plan. The St. Boniface council sponsored a public meeting on behalf of 
a group of citizens 'tvho 1-rere \vorried about the loss of St. Boniface r s 
identity. Hr. Prince, the leader of the St. Boniface group told the 
council to !lhelp us prove to them (the government) that they are rail-
d " 71 roa ing us • 
The opposition to the Fhite Paper presented three main avenues of 
attack: 1. the cost of one big city 
2. the loss of local identity 
3. the introduction of party politics to Greater 1iTinnipeg 
Els\·TOod Bole and Robert Smellie led the attack against unification because 
of its cost. On January 14, l1r. Bole said centralization, amalgamation 
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of police and fire services and consolidation of services provided at 
different levels of the municipality \vould cost an additional $18 to $20 
million or an increase of 17 mills.72 Later he put this into dollar 
terms by stating that the taxes of most residents would increase by $100. 
Robert Smellie called the proposals in the Hhite Paper "a Frankenstein's 
Honster that ~.rill come to haunt you uhen your get your tax bill". 73 
The concentration of attention on the issue of cost led Ellen Gallagher, 
the executive assistane to Mr. Cherniack, to 'tvrite that "the main theme 
of the public debate so far has been the cost of unifying services, 
and \vhile this is perhaps not an entirely irrelevant issue, it certa~-n.ly 
is a long way off the central point of the proposals."74 The main point 
for Hrs. Gallagher and the government \vas the quality of service provided. 
The issue of local identity \-7aS an emotional one: all the area 
municipalities discussed the issue but it ·pas in St. Boniface, vTith its 
tradition as the home of the French Fact in Hanitoba, where it made 
the most impact. Hany citizens felt that St. Boniface, Hhich in fact 
preceded the founding of Hinnipeg by half a century, would cease to 
be autonomous. A St. Boniface citizens group circulated a petition 
and planned a march to Ot ta'iva (>vhat good this -vmuld do, no one 
·bothered to explain). HoHever the intensity of the issue prompted 
the French Canadian Health Hinister, Hr. Rene Toupin to promise that 
the government 't.rould recognize the cultural identity of St. Boniface. 75 
The Hhite Paper ~·ras also criticized for prompting party politics 
at the local level. ~[any of the local mayors concentrated on this point 
and Robert Smellie put their position most succinctly 'Hhen he said the 
Hhite Paper was "the NDP manifesto for provincial control ••• it will 
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require party discipline to make it work, and ~-rhich of the three political 
parties is ready to fight an election at this time? One the NDP. They 
have designed the entire system in their favour."76 Hany opposition 
members such as L. R. Sherman, Conservative member for Fort Garry charged 
the goverP..ment \·7ith "callous pol-itical gerrymandering'' in the arrange-
ment of ~-rards under the proposed central city plan. 77 This charge of 
gerrymandering ·t-ras one of the most common complaints in the ear~y 
period of the conflict. 
The alternative plan proposed by the ten area mayors -- again only 
Stephen Juba and the municipality of East Kildonan ~.Jere opposed -- in 
many resP-ects clearly followed the report of the Local Boundaries Commission. 
The mayors proposed that: 
1. the present municipalities he kept; 
2. the present metro council be eliminated and a ne~-r regional council 
formed composed of the mayors and aldermen of the m1.mic5_palies; 
3. services administered by the neH council 'tvould roughly be comparable 
to those nm.:r performed by metro; 
4. the establishr<1ent of a Greater Hinnipeg Education Re~don as 
recommednded by the Local Gover~<ent Boundaries Commission.78 
The alternative proposed by the mayors revealed the pre-occupation 
of the group in preserving the status quo uith limited modifications. 
Government Stratep;y 
In response to the attacks on the F-:'lite Paper the strategy of the 
government appeared to be to try and defuse the issue as much as possible. 
trr. Cherniack refused to enter into a debate over the cost of unification 
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and said "we· are not forcing the unification of any services ••• The council 
itself vill be able to decide.n79 The one positive feature feature of 
the '.Jhite Paper extolled at all the public meetings 't·ms the benefit of 
equalization: n't·lhat He are saying is that if this equalization 't·:as in 
effect in 1970,, then 80 per cent would have paid less taxes. 80 
But 't·rhat the government tried hardest to do Fas to project an 
image of reasonableness and concern (compared to w4ny of the extreme 
statements of the opposition). A sampling of headlines for the period 
in question contains the follm·ring examples: "Changes possible: 
Mackling ••• City Plan can be changed" ••• Changes likely in Urban Plan) 
Cherniack •••• City Plan Changes possible, etc." In the debate over public 
auto insurance the government had been accused of being dictatorial, 
rigid and unbending. Obviously the strategy of Hr. Cherniack vas to 
change this image and have his opponents appear committed to the 
existing status quo. 
In one masterful rr1ove, the .govern1·nent took m·ray one of the most 
potent charges of the opposition and reinforced this image of reason-
ableness. On Honday, February 22, Premier Schreyer, announced that in 
response to the charges of gerrymandering, the government \.:rould set 
up and independent commission to revie'<:·:' boundaries: "He just vrant to 
make clear beyond a shadm·r of a doubt that charges of rigging the 
boundaries is just a bunch of childish nonsense."8l The head of the 
Commission vias Judge Peter Taraska and he '=·7as joined by Dr. Hugh 
Saunderson, the retired president of the University of Hanitoba and 
Charland PrudhoF~e the former clerk of the Legislative Assembly. On 
April 21, the Commission recormnended that the number of ,,7ards be in-
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creased to 50, the number of community committees to thirteen from ten, 
that the boundaries of several vrards be changed and the names of about a 
third of the v1ards changed. The Commission kept the government's 
criterion of about 10,000 people per ~.Jard but it felt that familiar 
polling divisions used in the past should be retained nas much as 
possible ~vi thin the new ward boundaries''. 82 On Hay 14th, Mr. Cherniack 
accepted the Taraska report in its entirety and said the government 
was ''most favourably impressed. "83 The Taraska Report, of course, did 
not deal in any important 'tvay ~7ith the central aspects of the Hhite 
Paper (the terms of reference ~·rere tightly dravm) it merely changed 
details. But it seemed to give the approval of an independent board to 
the Hhite Paper and it took a potent issue a1:vay from the opposition. 
(See Figures 4 and 5). t:,' 
The success of the governr-~ent 1 s attempts to "cool'' the political 
temperature on Unicity can be seen by the response to the public meetings. 
On January 27, 1971 about tHo hundred citizens of South Hinnipeg met to 
discuss the plan and in the first fe\v gatherings hundreds of people 
turned out. Hmv-ever, despite the efforts of the local cauncils, it ·Has 
apparent that there was as much support for the central city concept 
as opposition. Indeed, as the public meetings continued it became 
obvious that Unicity was not a "hot" political issue in the minds 
of most voters. The attendance at the meetings began to fade out and 
in the end only 50 or 60 people 1vere turning up. Sidney Green, vrho 1;-:ras 
as active as Hr. Cherniack in defending the plan, stated publicly that the 
poor attendance revealed the lack of success of the area municipalities 
in Hhipping up opposition to the Hhite Paper.84 
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A telephone poll conducted by the Institute of Urban Studies of 
the University of Hinnipeg confirmed this anlysis: about half the 
responoents thought that some change in the structure of local govern-
ment was desirable, but many were ignorant of the government's proposals 
and most said their stand Hould not affect their vote. The only clear 
image to come from the survey was that 87% of the respondents favoured 
the direct election of the central city mayor.85 
A final indication of the real lack of public interest may be 
the St. Vital by-election held April 5th. The St. Vital council ·had 
taken a strong stand against Unicity and the seat had formerly been held 
by a Conservative. Em-rever, the NDP candidate Jim Halding ~·78.S successful. 
The by-election had occurred in the middle of the Ehite Paper conflict 
and Hr. Falding said his election proved that voters supported the central 
city concept. Ho~vever most observers thought that the central city plan 
had not been much of an issue one \.J"ay or another, and that most voters 
were not affected by it. But if "local identity11 \·Ias as important to 
the suburb as the council felt, it is likely t'nicity v70uld have been 
accorded a more essential role in the campaign. 
The opponents of the 'Ffhite Paper then, clearly failed in making 
the issue as decisive, far-reaching and emotional as they had hope,J. 
Their strategy had been to create so much public furor that the government 
would be forced to back down. A recent ezample of a nearly successful 
campaign was the auto-insurance dispute and if the municipalities had 
been able to ,,Tage a similar campaign they might have succeeded (the 
Government vms less connitted to llnicity than it -.:vas on auto insurance). 
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By the time the Legislature began to debate the bill, the municipalities 
knew t_hey had lost. As the Hinnipeg Tribune "rrote about the brief of 
the city of St. James, "Hayor F..anks, who up to now has been one of the 
chief opponents of the Unicity Plan, offered little criticism, indicating 
his suburb and municipality has more or less given up the fight and re-
signed itself to the idea that the scheme 'tvill go ahead. 86 
The government t-mged a skilful strategy and outmanoeuvered the 
municipalities but the failure of the suburbs lies deeper than mere tactics. 
In essence, the basic assumption of the suburban politicians -- that local 
identity vJas an important factor \vas no longer valid. I·Jinnipeg had 
become an integrated unit and it ·was the local boundaries, not Unicity, 
which vlere regard as artificial. In a revealing quote, Hilliam Greenfield, 
a strong Fort Garry opponent of the \,Jbite Paper, \vas asked if he favoured 
a referendum on the government proposals. "I certainly ~·muld not", he 
shot back. "Hayor Juba has done such a good job of selling the \·lhite 
Paper that people in \\Test Kildonan as 't·rell as in East Kildonan and even 
Charleswood believe him."87 In their attacks upon the Hhite Paper the 
mayors of the suburbs only represented themselves and as soon as the 
government realized this fact, Bill 36 became a certainty. 
Bill 36 
On April 28, 1971, the Government released the draft of Bill 36. 
The draft legislation still called for a 48 member council but Hr. Cherniack 
had already .. ,announced that the Taraska report i·JOuld be accepted. The 
Hinister said that there Here no major changes from the government 1 s 
Hhite Paper but rather it ,.:as "more of an elaboration!1 of that paper. 88 
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In response to the demands of St. Boniface, the bill clearly contained 
inPart III, a declarat:ion that the ne't-7 city "shall make available at 
its central office persons ">vho could communicate in French and Englishn 
and that all notices, bills or statements made to the residents 
of St. Boniface would be in French and English. The leading defender 
of the cause of Franco-Hanitobans, St. Boniface H.L.A. Larry Desjardins, 
soon announced that he would support the bill and was satisfied with the 
protection given the French language. 
Bill 36 did reveal in more detail how bodies like the community 
committees and Board of Co~nissioners were to operate and it carefully 
outlined the structure of the connittee system of council:- A departure 
from most other Hunicipal acts which usually allo-v: local councils to 
structure themselves as they please. The Bill contained neH and complex 
codes on items like assessment, taxation and borro1·!ing althouf;h pro-
visions from the 1956 Uinnipeg Charter anrl 1960 Hetropolitan T·7innipeg 
Act ·1,-1ere included as muach as possible to snooLh the transition. One 
interesting addition to the legisla'cion was the provision that comrnunity 
conferences elect resident advisory groups of citizens to "advise and 
assert':' the community co:rnmittees. The Bill delegated to the City 
important and innovative planning and development po~orers and in its 
final form the :Sill increased the size of the Executive Policy Comnittee 
to 10 members to ensure city 1vide representation rather than the 4 
proposed in the \:'bite Paper. But in all major matters the Bill closely 
follo\ved the Vhite Paper. (See Figure 6), 
On nay 10, Hr. Cherniack introduced the bill for first reading 
and on June 3, the debate on second reading began. Debate lasted a month 
58. 
and on July 9, 1971 the bill was passed with a vote of 31-15. Liberal 
Gordon Johnson defected from his party to support the government and 
independent Gordon Beard followed suit. From July 14 to 16, the lat·7 
amendments committee heard public presentations, largely from the mayors 
in the Hetropolitan area and on July 21, with only one significantchange 
--an amendment allo~dng the direct election of the mayor -- the committee 
completed clause-by-clause debate. July 24, the bill passed third 
reading 22-14 with Conservative Inez Trueman, member for the 'Pinnipeg 
constituency of Fort Rouge, supporting the govera~ent. 
In the Legislature, the three parties simply rehashed the debate 
which had followed the publication of the Phite Paper. Led by }1r. Cherniack, 
the NDP put fort·7ard the position that Hinnipeg "'as one socio-economic 
community ~..rhich should be unified '!;·Jith encouragement for participation 
through the \·mrd system and the co:rnmunity cornnittees. The Liberal and 
Conservative parties both favoured schemes of reorganization based on the 
Local Boundaries Commission. 89 Suburban members like Conservatives 
Frank Johnson, or Liberal Steve Patrick attacked the government on the 
old themes of cost of unification, preservation of local identity, 
gerr)~andering, and introducing party politics at the local level. 
-Conservative rural members such as Harry Rnns were fearful that rural 
Hanitoba \·muld be called upon to contribute financially to the City of 
Hinnipeg and that the City \vas gaining too much political clout. On 
June 22, Sidney Spivak, the leader of the Conservative opposition, 
offered a sophisticated critique and asked a series of pointed questions 
about the powers of the city bureaucracy vis-a-vis those of the co~~unity 
committees. 
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But despite isolated examples of useful criticism, the impression 
one gets from the legislative discussion is that the members were only 
going through the motions. The government had a majority and was now 
firmly committed to the plan. All the arguments had been heard before. 
In fact, with the exception of Hr. Cherniack's opening address, no NDP 
member arose to debate the bill until follmving Hr. Spivak's speech of 
Jun:e 22. The Premier spoke briefly and vaguely. By and large it 'tvas a 
disappointing debate. 
The suburbs, in fact, had turned from trying to defeat the bill 
'v-hich they knev7 Has impossible, to organizing for the October civic 
elections 't·lhich preceded the January 1, 1972 date for the new council. 
Organizations called The Independent Citizens' Election Associations 
began to spring up first in the suburbs and then in the city itself. 
As the 1-linnipeg Tribune described the activity "formations are taking 
place that look like a gang-up against the Ne~-7 Democrats in the anti-
cipated battle for seats on the proposed one-city counci1."9() The 
raison d'etre of the new civic party uas independence from the organized 
national parties but partisan politics undoubtedly entered into the 
calculations of its leaders. Prominent individuals in the Conservative 
and Liberal parties vTere active in the movement and 't·7hile these men Here 
genuine about their desire for so-called "independence'', a more compelling 
motivation 't-Jas their fear that the ne,:.J city council \vauld become controlled 
by the NDP. 
By the summer of 1971, Unicity "i·'as in and the only contentious item 
remaining ,,Tas the nature of the mayoralty and this \,.,hole issue ~:-;ras 
overshadm-Jed by the personality of Stephen Juba. 
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breaking vote. This episode shm.;rs his unpopularity among his own 
council -- if he 'tvas going to be mayor he would have to be elected. 
At approximately this time Hr. Juba began to make statements about 
running as the head of a slate of candidates to contest the fall elec-
tion an~ if Juba had run a slate it would probably have been most 
effective in North Hinnipeg -- the centre of NDP strength. 
As Bill 36 moved to the law amendments committee the only real 
question 'tvas the mayoralty. Tv7enty-seven presentations were made to 
the committee but the groups represented reveal the lack of significant 
interest group activity in ~.Jinnipeg local politics. Thirteen of the 
briefs came from local mayors, aldermen, or metro councillors. There 
were only two representatives of ethnic groups the St. Boniface citizensr 
group ~entioned above and a Ukranian otganization opposed to official 
languages; two professional bodies--the Institute of Urban Studies 
and the 11anitoba Association of Architects-~he Chamber of Commerce 
. J 
and the Liberal Party. Seven individuals made personal appeals. There 
were no briefs from rate-payers associations, real estate interests, 
planning groups, companies, labour unions, 't·7elfare agencies, or community 
associations. Apparently only the local politicians v1ere interested 
in -.:-;rhat \vas going on. 
The event everyone 'tvas 'tvaiting for 1vas the address of the 1-fayor. 
On the evening of Thursday, July 15, he gave a classic performance. He 
was all milk and honey -- ni take my hat off to the lTD:--", except vrhen he 
strongly .criticized the Local Boundaries Coll11-nissicn ~"that v;ras the farce 
of all Royal Coll11-:tissions every held." But he made it clear that he Hanted 
to be mayor and that only througb direct election could he achieve his 
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dream: 11 I have a good imagination", he said, "but I can't stretch it 
that far as to see the council electing me mayor. Can you imagine 
i-Jankling (Hayer of Fort Garry) or Yanofsky {1-iayor of Hest Kildonan) 
voting for me?n96 
On July 21, in the only significant departure from the 1-:rh:ite 
Paper, Hr. Cherniack announced that the mayor \vould be directly elected. 
Like the community committee dispute the final result was a compromise--
the first mayor of Unicity 'l:vould be directly elected, in subsequent 
years the council would decide. 
Perhaps the most important factor in changing the goverrrment's 
mind was the series of public meetings held in January and February. 
The suburban opponents of Fnicity could be dismissed as special pleaders 
but the one change in the Hhite Paper demanded by almost everyone vJas 
the direct election of the mayor. Finnipeg had ahmys had a directly 
elected mayor and it \•JaS difficult for people to understand uhy this Pould 
be changed. This made an impression on the government. 
The Cabinet Committee considering Unicity became split on the issue. 
One body of opinion held that Hinni]"'eg required an area ·Hide approach 
tmvards problems as 'l:vell as the opinio:1:'· of the local ~·7ards and that this 
would best be achieved by having the nayor elected by the \·rhole city. 
Others felt that because Finnipeg \vas used to mayoralty elections the 
-.:.:rhole transition process uould be eased if Bill 36 \-:ere changed. 
Opponents of the direct election argued that the v:hole logic of Unicity 
demanded a Parliamentary rather than a Presidential executive. 
The future career of Stephen Juba was not a primary consideration. 
But those ;.;rho favoured changing the bill may have felt that ensuring 
Juba' s support >·muld avoid creating a. f'O\.Jerful opp0nent of Unicity and the 
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public s~pport for a directly elected mayor may have been generated 
because the citizens of Hinnipeg \.ranted Stephen Juba as their ch;Lef 
executive. Juba's-influence then was indirect but pervasive. 
The actual circumstances of the change ••ere dramatic. Unable 
to agree, the Cabinet thre\.J the decision to the NDP caueus. The caucus 
was just as split as the Cabinet and the votes '"1ere closely divided. 
Finally the Premier intervened and cast a tie breaking vote that brought 
about the change. The decision bought the Government time. If the 
opponents \vere right and the directly elected mayor Has not \..rorking v1ith 
council the \vay he should, the system "t.;rould revert to its original form 
in three years. If the compromise \·Jas Harking a pernanent amendment 
could be brought in. In any case, Stephen Juba achieved his dream--
he \·JOuld be the first super nayor of Finnipeg. 
Conclusion 
The literature revie;;·r on metropolitan reform emphasized the signi-
ficance of the political environment, the motivations and resources 
of the participants and the strategies employed by the contending 
factions. The Hinnipeg case example also reveals the central irr1por·· 
· tance of these classes of factors. 
The environment of urban politics in Hinnipeg \vas a curious 
blend of tradition and change. Economic factors like the impact 
of Hinnipeg on the economy of Hanitoba were the major reason \vhy "Pinnipeg 
problems could not be ignored. It was too vital to the life of the 
province and too many voters lived there, for any senior government 
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to leave its problems unattended. The ethnic diversity of ~-l'innipeg 
deeply affected local politics and in particular made Stephen Juba 
into a powerful participant. The political setting of _I·Jinnipeg, 
largely shaped by the events and aftermath of the 1919 General Strike, 
was a key factor. 
The strike polarized the city into two main voting blocs and 
north 1\Tinnipeg became a center of support for the CCF - NDP. Building 
on their support in 'Hinnipeg, the NDP finally became the Provincial 
Government in 1969. Identified \Jith the central city for over forty 
years, the 1IDP \vas committed to amalgamation. In 1919 a local party 
composed of businessmen and the more conservative elements of the city was 
formed which by and large has controlled Pinnipeg since that time. 
Devoted to an anti-socialist, anti-party, pro-business platform, 
this coalition has made its ideas the prevailing style in local 
Hinnipeg politics. By 197 0, like Harold Kaplan-! s case study of l'ietro-
politan governtnent in Toronto, 'Fin~ipeg' s local government could be 
characterized as an executive dominant system vith a fair amount of 
consensus and lmv levels of public or interest group participation. 
In the battle over Bill 36, the political temperature continued 
·to be lo>:v. The public did not seem to get aroused in any significant 
way and perhaps more surprisingly the level of interest group activity 
't~as almost minimal. Few pressure groups appeared to enter the conflict 
over Bill 36 (in contrast to Smalh;ood 's case example of London vYhere 
several professional groups were important actors) and almost none seem 
to have influenced the actual creation of the \-mite Paper. Unlike some 
issues in Hanitoba -- notably the dispute over auto insurance ~- actors 
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like the ne~.;spapers, labour unions and business groups did not appear 
to be .overly concerned. The only bodies 'tvith active roles v7ere the formal 
decision-makers -- the local governments, the':' Cabinet, , the legislature 
and the parties. 
The anti-party, anti-socialist tradition also continued to be 
succ~ssful in the October 1971 municipal election 'tvhen the Independent 
Citizens Election Committe (I. C. E. C.) decisively beat the ~p.97 
The Participants 
As stated above, the active participants in the battle over Bill 36 
were relatively fe-.;·;r. On the one hand there -vTas the I'IDP Government supported 
by the city of Hinnipeg, Hetro, and professional groups and on the other 
there were the area municipalities; the Conse:rvative and Liberal parties 
in the legislature and some citizens' groups. The initiating factors 
-.;-:ere a result of the decade-long conflict bet·Heen Hayer Juba a.nd lietro. 
The inability of the t>vo most important local governments to cooperate 
forced various provincial governments to intervene tk~oughout the 
Sixties. The motivations of Stephen Juba. -- Hhose single-minded obsession 
\.. .... -:2;~- '{2_, 
v1ith_}letro fueled the dispute -- are some-.;.;hat obscure but they werepro-
bably a combination of egc-drive,committment, and a desire to have a 
convenient -.;.;rhipping boy. His political resources of successful vote-
getting, skill at using the media, and ethnic appeal far outstripped 
Hetro's. 
The most important participants w·ithin the government were Cabinet 
Hinisters Saul Cherniack and Sidney Green and consultant Heyer Brow-nstone. 
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Cherniack and Green had both been members of the Hetro Council and ~vere 
personally convinced of the benefits of unification. Bro~vnstone contri-
buted much of the impetus towards achieving greater pa~ticipation. The 
government as a -v.rhole was fed up with the bickering betv:reen Hetro 
and the City of Hinnipeg and was determined to resolve the situation, i.e. 
there was a felt need that change 'l:vas required. 
The government received much of its political strength from the 
central city and unification 'l:vould loHer taxes and increase the ability 
of central 1-Tinnipeg to pay for services. Amalgamation had long been part 
of the program of the :NDP and it -vras committed to reforming Hinnipeg' s 
local government structures; one of the constraints upon the government 
Has the desire of suburban ministers like Al Hackling or Saul Hiller 
to retain some form of local identity. This compromise resulted in 
the concept of corr~unity committees. The government ~~ployed economic 
inducements as a resource. The mill rates, for example, '\vere lo\·7ered 
for 80% of the citizens and those suburbs whose rates '"ould go up 
received a transitional grant from the government. 
The motivations of the area municipalities Here quite simple --
their very existe:nce -.:·ras at stake and Hell hath no fury like a politician 
·about to lose his job. The motivations of the Liberals and Conservatives 
were political: the backbone of these nm parties were suburban repre-
sentatives and rural strength. Neither of these groups ':vere much in 
favour of Unicity. Each hope to make gains in the suburbs by opposing 
Bill 36 and in the case of the Liberals this meant reversing previous 
party policy \·7hich had favoured amal~amation. 
---------------------------------------------------------
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Strategies/Results 
The battle over Bill 36 was fought in three main theatres: the 
press and the initial public meetings, the legislature, and finally the 
law amendments committee. In each of the locals the opposing groups were 
attempting to do different things. In the first arena, the government 
was saT'lpling public opinion and the area municipalities "t-!ere attempting 
to demonstrate a large public groundswell against the Hhite Paper. In 
the legislature the parties >·!ere merely making political points to use 
against each other in the fall election municipally or later provincially 
(i.e. put it on the record). In the law amendments stage, professional 
groups like the Institute of Urban Studies, attempted to use their 
expertise to change the details of the bill and Hayor Juba and others 
attempted to demonstrate personally the fervor with which they held their 
vieHs. 
There \.Jere various stages of the campaign. For the first month 
or so the government and potential opponents made their preliminary 
moves. Rather than present a bill on the subject of urban reform, the 
government published a 1-?hite Paper \·Jhich enabled them to present their 
ideas while not becoming too firmlyattacked if the politicai temperature 
. became heated. The mayors of the area municipalities met informally, 
compared notes, and then announced their opposition at the formal meeting 
of January 21. The Hhite Paper stage of the conflict continued until 
the end of April uhen the government brought dmm the bill Hhich contaiued 
the Hhite Paper proposals. This -vms the key period in the history of 
Bill 36, \vhen Unicity could have been defeated. The Bill 36 stage of 
the conflict included the debate in the legislature and the attempts of 
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various groups to change specifics of the act. 
The strategy of the government was to keep Unicity from becoming 
a "live" political issue. There were elements in the Hhite Paper which 
could trigger off an emotional battle and at all costs the government 
wanted to avoid a repetition of the auto insurance debate. The goverTh~e~ 
adopted the tactic of "s~.;reet reasonableness" where it was willing to 
change non-essentials as long as the main outlines remained frim. To 
avoid the charge of being dictatorial, it set up a series of public 
meetings where cabinet ministers appeared receptive to change. The 
Taraska Commission \vas appointed to revie1v the \·Jard boundaries, and the 
French language \·Jas made an official language to appease the citizens 
of St. Boniface. The government bought off a potential source of 
opposition when they guaranteed that all municipal employees and officials 
\·lOuld retain their existing salaries under Unicity. At the last moment 
when Bill 36 \Vas safe, they also changed the nature of the mayoralty. 
The strategy of the area municipalities was the opposite of the 
government: they needed to transform Unicity into an intensive issue v7ith 
wide scope vJhich \·lOuld attract major currents of opposition. Because 
of the fight in Cabinet over the CoDmunity committees, it was felt that 
the government, as a \·7hole, was not as strongly committed to Unicity 
as it had been to dther issues. If enough public opposition could be 
generated, the government might retreat. Opponents to Unicity made 
strong attacks in the papers, the local councils put out propaganda and 
aided citizen groups to form, but the issue never jelled. The suburban 
mayors simply did not have enough political resources to constitute a 
real obstacle to the government. 
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Bill 36, then, is an important policy innovation. It was born 
in response to difficult environmental problems. It contained a novel 
approach to the solution of these problems and its ado~tion was the result 
of a major political confrontation. The battle over the Unicity restruc-
turing throws light not only on the peculiarities of the Hinnipeg political 
culture but also on some of the generalizations of the local government 
literature. 
TABLE 1 
MUNICIPALITIES A}ID POPULATION 
Metropolitan Winnipeg 1971 
MUNICIPALITY POPlJLATION AREA (sq. miles) 
R. M. Charleswood 11,300 36.7 
R. M. Fort Garry 26,730 26.8 
R. M. North Kildonan 17,5Q9 9.3 
R. M. Old Kildonan 1,432 9.4 
Town of Tuxedo 3,218 7.5 
City of East Kildonan 29,897 3.2 
City of Hest Kildonan 23,962 2.8 
City of St. Vital 32,789 22.6 
City of Transcona 22,385 9.4 
City of St. Boniface 47,553 18.2 
City of St. James-Assiniboia 71,762 41.8 
City of Hinnipeg 259,946 30.7 
total unicity 548,573 218.4 
Source Hinnipeg: Canada's Third La.rge$t City, (Hinnipeg: City 
of Winnipeg, 1972), p. 12. 
TABLE 2 
POPT..i'LATION GROHTH FOR THE 
CITY OF ~U~'"NIPEG AND METROPOLITAN AREA 
1876 - 1966 
CITY OF METROPOLITAN AREA 
YEAR WINNIPEG (including Winnipeg) 
1876 3,240 
1881 7,977 
1891 25,639 
1901 44,778 48,488 
1911 128,157 156,969 
1921 179,087 229,212 
1931 218,785 294,905 
1941 221,960 302,024 
1951 235,710 354,069 
1961 265,429 475,989 
1966 257,005 508,759 
Source Report of the Social Service Audit, ( I·Jinnipeg 
Service Audit Committee, 1969 ) p. 7. 
Social 
TABLE 3 
ETHNIC GROUPS AS PER CENT OF TOTAL POPULATION 
1961 
ETHNIC GROUP METRO HINNIPEG MUNICIPALITY 
British Isles 45.0 42.8 47.7 
German 10.5 11.4 9.5 
French 8.4 5.3 12.3 
Italian 1.2 1.6 .7 
Netherlands 3.1 2.6 3.8 
Polish 5.2 6.2 4.0 
Russian .9 1.0 .7 
Scandinavian 3.7 3.8 3.7 
Ukranian 11.3 13.6 8.5 
Other European 8.6 9.4 7.6 
Asiatic .7 .9 .4 
Other 1.4 1.6 1.1 
Source Report of the Social Service Audit, ( Hinnipeg 
Service Audit Committee, 1969 ) p. 12. 
Social 
CORE AREA 
36.9 
12.6 
7.4 
2.3 
2.3 
6.8 
1.0 
4.1 
15.0 
8.3 
1.4 
2.0 
LEGEND: 
FIGURE I 
Boundaries of Former Municipalities 
in the Greater Hinnipeg Area 
MAP 
Boundaries of area U'ldcr former Metropolitan Corporation of Greater w;nnipeg. 
Additional areas included under "l!mc!ty." 
Source: Metropolitan Corporation of Greater Winnipeg, Planning Division 
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Boundaries of t-Jinnipeg Community Committees ( 1972 ) 
COMMITTEE 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
AREAS 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
KILDO 
45,658 
\ 
I 
I 
\ ~ 
~ 
AN 
_j_ 
COMMITTEE ON ENVIRONMENT 
Composition: 
7 members of council 
I 
COHMISSIONER OF 
ENVIRONMENT . 
l 
I 
• Planning (including 
transportation, open 
space and parks plan-
ning, and development 
of the environment 
• Housing 
• Urban Renewal 
• Pollution regulation _ 
and control :J 
• Health and social 
development 
FIGURE 6 
Government of Winnipeg 1972 
CITY COUNCIL 
Composition: 
50 councillors elected on ward basis 
1 mayor elected at large 
(lst term only) 
EXECUTIVE POLICY COl'IHITTEE 
Composition: 
Hayer (chairman) 1 
8hairman of standing committees 3 ther members or counc11 6 
Total Io 
--~ .. r 
.---CO_MM_I_T_T_E_E_O_N_r_'I-N-ANCE~ em. 1NITTEE ON HORKS AND 
. . OPERATIONS Compos1t1on: C · i ompos1t on: 
7 members of Council 7 h f c '1 
I 
COMMISSIONER OF 
FINANCE . 
J 
l 
• Assessment 
• Finance 
• Personnel 
• Purchasing 
• Protection of 
persons and 
property 
ROARD OF 
COMHISSIONERS 
CHIEF l 
COMNISSIONER _ 
• Budget Bureau 
• Infot~ation Systems 
. Lm..r department 
• Clerk's department 
mer.1 ers o ounc1 
Co:t-JMISSIONER ~ 
HORKS 
AND OPERATIONS 
I 
• Transit 
. Streets 
. Traffic control 
Utilities 
• Waste collection 
and d:lsposal 
. Engineering and 
design 
-
• Parks and Recreation 
• Cultural facilities 
Source: Hinnipe_g_: Canada's Third Largest.~ity. ( Hinnipeg: City of 1\'innipeg, 1972) p.26. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. I ~rlsh to thank the Institute of Urban Studies, University of Winnipeg 
for permission to reproduce this shorter version of my-monograph, The 
Politics of Innovation: Report Number 2, Futl_!.re Cj_ty Series, Hinnipeg: 
Institute of Urban Studies, 1971). 
2. See, for example, the article by Stephen Clarkson, "Hinnipeg Shows Hay to a Better 
Hetro", in the Ottawa Journal, November 8, 1971. 
3. For a good discussion of the impact of Jacksonian democracy, see Scott 
Greer, _Governing the Hetronolis, (Ne~oJ York: John Hiley and Sons, 1962). 
The problems encountered in attempting metropolitan reform in the United 
States are discussed in D.A. Booth, Metropolitics: The Nashville Con-
solidation, (East Lansing: Michigan State University, 1963); Hilliam 
Harvard and Floyd Corry, ''The Merger of Governments in the Baton Rouge Area" 
in J. Zimme:L"!llan, Government of the Hetrof!olis, (Ne-v:r York: Holt, Rhinehart 
and Winston, Inc., 1968); E. Sofen, The }1iami Metropolitan Experiment, 
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1963); and R. 'Holff, Miami Hetro, 
(Coral Gabler: University of Miami Press, 1960). 
4. In the monograph, Politics of Innovation, I attempt to discuss the relevance 
of the literature on innovation and social change to the question of 
assessing urban reform. 
5. Frank Smalh·:rood~ Greater London: The Politics of Hetropolitan Reform, 
(Ne\-7 York: Bobbs-Herrill, 1965), p. 368-313. 
6. Harold Kaplan, Urban Politicc.l Systems, (Ne~,y York: Columbia University 
Press, 1967), p. 157. 
7. See Edv;rard C. Banfield, Jarr<.2.::: Q. Pilson, City Politics, (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1963). 
8. Jam~s Q. Hilson, in City Politics and Public Policy, (Ne'I:-T York: John 
Wiley and Sons, 1968) defines political culture as: "a widely shared, 
patterned view of the proper scope and behaviour of public institutions 
and specifically what ways of behaviour on public voters .•• would be 
thought legitimat.e11 , p. 12. 
9. Report of the Social Service Audit, sponsored by the Government of Hanitoba, 
United Way of Greater Winnipeg, the Winnipeg Foundation, Community 
Welfare Planning Council, June, 1969, p. 6. 
10. "The Indian-Metis Urban Proben, a study by the Indian and Metis Friendship 
Centre and the Institute of Urban Studies, January, 1971. It is difficult 
to pinpoint exactly how many native people live in the city since the 
population is highly transient. 
11. Ibid., p. 7. 
12. Government of Hanitoba, Proposals for ilrhan 'Peorganization in the Greater 
\·:'innipeg Area , (Hinnipeg: Queen's Printer, 1970), p. 9. Hereafter referred 
to as ''The Fnite Paper". 
13. Social Service Audit, pp. 9-10. 
14. Ibid., p. 10. 
15. Planning Division, the Hetropolitan Corporation, The Place of Greater 
l.J'innipeg in the Economy of Hanitoba, (Hinnipeg: the Hetropolitan Corporation, 
1971), p. 25. 
16. Ibid., pp. 25-55. 
17. Ibid., p. 84. 
18. In the late 1960 1 s a flood'I;·JaY vJas finally constructed. This removed a 
threat which had plagued Winnipeg since the great 1950 flood but it also 
destroyed one of the favourite spring pastimes of students -- estimating 
33. See the Report of the Exploratory Sub-Committeeon the Organization 
of Local Government Service in the Greater Winnipeg Area, Manitoba 
Provincial-l1uilicipal Committee Report, February, 1953, p. 83. 
34. Ibid., p. 84. 
35. Ron. Douglas Campbell, "Statement of Government Policy", contained 
in the Manitoba Provincial-Municipal Committee Report, February, 
1953, p. 174. 
36. Hr. Kushner has spent much of his time on local government revie't.;rs 
Secretary to the GHIC in 1959, he held the same position on the 1966 
Local Government Boundaries Commission. In bet"t.reen, he was on the 
1963 Municipal Enquiry Commission. The reports of the GHIC and 
the Local Government Boundaries Comnission are remarkably alike. 
37. The opinions of both the City of l}innipeg and the municipalities 
in 1957 ~·7ere virtually unchanged in 1971. In July of 1956 and May 
of 1957, the City of Winnipeg stated that a Metro solution 'ivould be 
acceptable under certain conditions, but that amalgamation '<vas in-
evitable and highly desirable. This galvanfzed the suburban 
municipalities to 'ivrite a joint brief (Assiniboia, East Kildonan, 
West Kildona, St. Vital, North Kildonan, Fort Garry, St. James, 
Transcona and Tuxedo) which attacked the whole idea of amalgamation 
and advocated a Metropolitan Government with the members of the 
central council composed of the mayors and aldermen of the participating 
munic'ipalities. 
38. Greater Hinnipeg Investigating Commission, Report and RecolT'!!lendations, 
Hinnipeg, 1959. 
39. City of Hinnipeg Council, "Submission to the Government of Manitoba", 
October, 1959. 
40. Intervie;.Ts. 
41. This assessment ·of the options faced by the Government has been 
gleaned from interviews. 
42. Winnipeg Tribune, June 3, 1961. 
43. Winnipeg Tribune, June 5, 1961. 
44. Winnipeg Tribune, September 22, 1969. 
45. Interviews. 
46. Bonnycastle once told an interviewer that his only previous political 
experience was in the 1920's when as a student in Oxford he worked 
in London for the election of Winston Churchill - Churchill lost. 
47. l\Tinnipeg Free Press, October 1, 1960. 
48. "{.!innipeg Free Press, Hay 23, 1961. 
49. George Rich, '"Hetropolitan Hinnipeg'', p. 368. 
50. Winnipeg Tribune, April 10, 1967. 
51. 1-!innipeg Free Press, February 13, 19 62. · 
52. Jim Hayes, Hinnipeg Tribune, April 10, 1962. 
53. The Hetropolitan Corporation of Greater Hinnipeg Revie~.;r Commission, 
February 1964, p. 32. 
54. Local Government Boundaries Commission, Provisional Plan for Local 
Government Units in the Greater Hinnipeg ,'\rea , 1970, p. 66 • 
. 55. B. R. 1-Jolfe, nA RevieH nf Restructuring For Regional Government 11 , 
a brief to the La1-: A..TTlendi'l.ents Committee, Province of ~1anitoba, July, 
1971. 
56. IntervieHs. 
57. Hinni-oeg Free Press, June 1n, 1971. 
58. Hin~eg Free Pr_ess, December ?" ~ . .)' 1970. 
59. Hhite Pape·c, P. 11, 
-------------------------·---------------------~----------· 
60. VJinnipeg Free Press, July 3, 1971. 
61. James Lorimer, quoted by Gail Cook and Lionel Feldman, "Approaches 
to Local Government R~form", Canadian Tax Journal, May-June, 1972, 
p·.218. 
'"' 62. Bill Burdeney, "Party Politics and Regional Government.: in the Future 
City, ed. Lloyd rua-mrthy, Institute of Urban Studies, Winnipeg, 1?71, 
p. 34. 
63. Winnipeg Free Press, October 7, 1971. 
64 Hergers vrere to take place betw·een East and North Kildonan; Old and 
'Hest Kildonan; and Charlesvmod, Tuxedo, Fort Garry. The number of 
Community Committees was later increased to 13. 
65. Winnipeg Tribune, February 25, 1971. 
66. Pinnipeg: Free Press, December 24, 1970. 
67. \,Jinnipeg Free Press, January 22, 1971. 
68. i\Tinnipeg Tribune, July 20, 1971. 
69. Winnipeg Tribune, February 13, 1971. 
70. Winnipeg Free Press, Harch 26, 1971. 
71. St. Boniface Courier, May 12, 1971. 
72. Hinnipeg Free Press, January 14, 1971. 
73. Hinnipeg Tribune, January 27, 1971. 
. 74. Winnipeg Free Press, March 13 
' 
1971. 
75. Hinnipeg Free Press, February 4, 1971. 
76. Winnipeg Free Press, Harch 21' 1971. 
77. Hinnipeg Free Press, February 12, 1971. 
78. l·linnipeg Tribune, April 2, 1971. 
79. Hinnipeg Tribune, January 22, 1971. 
80. \Jinnipeg Free Press, January 21, 1971. 
81. 
82. 
83. 
84. 
viinnipeg 
~Jinnipeg 
Hinnipeg 
1-.Tinnipeg 
Tribune, February 23, 1971. 
Free Press, April 21, 1971. 
Free Press, May 14, 1971. 
Tribune, March 2, 1971. 
85. Hinnipeg Free Press, April 18, 1971. 
86. 1-Jinnipeg Tribune, July 15, 1971. 
87. Hinnipeg Free Press, January 13, 1971.--
88. \Vinnipeg Free Press, April 29·, 1971. 
89. The Liberal Party thus made a 180 degree shift from its pro-amalgamation 
posistion of 1968. Hm.:rever, since flexibility has always been one of 
cardinal Liberal virtues this flip flop seemed to bother party members 
not a whit. 
90. Hinnipeg Tribune, June 19, 1971. 
91. '·Jinnipeg Tribune, June 26, 1971. 
92. \·Jinnipeg Free Press, February 11, 1971. 
93. Pinnipeg Free Press, April 2, 1971. 
94. Finnipeg Tribune,_ July 15, 1971. 
95. Hinnineg Tribune, July 7, 1971. 
96. l~innipeg Tribune, July 16, 1971. 
97. In the October 6th election only 7 NDP candidates -vrere successful. 
The turnout vras a record 60.7% and Stephen Juba defeated his old 
rival Hetro chairman Jack Hillis 139,174 votes to 49,014. 
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